

# God-Realization Through Reason



# GOD-REALIZATION THROUGH REASON

BY  
SWAMI ISWARANANDA



SRI RAMAKRISHNA ASHRAMA  
VILANGAN, P. O. PURANATTUKARA  
TRICHUR, KERALA

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## PREFACE

The first edition of this book was published in July 1953 under the title, '*Talks on Jñāna Yoga*'. This book has been renamed '*God-Realization Through Reason*' as many a reader on reading the title only of the first edition got the impression that it is only a re-discussion or study of Swami Vivekananda's lectures on *Jñāna Yoga*, whereas it is an entirely independent work. The topics discussed, the approach to, and the technique of jñānayoga expounded in this book are different from those of Swamiji's lectures. To remove the misunderstanding, a change in the title of the book has been thought advisable.

It is hoped that the book will also serve as a valuable supplement to Swamiji's lectures for a fuller and more intimate understanding of jñānayoga. The Upaniṣadic traditions were of two kinds: one theological and mystical and the other rational. Of these, Swami Vivekananda followed the rationalist tradition up to a certain point and advocated, as the final step, mysticism or yoga which culminated in intuition and inspiration in the superconscious state. The rationalist tradition, on the other hand, represented by the ṛṣis to whom this book is dedicated, stuck to reason of the conscious state to the very end for the highest realization, and this book follows their tradition.

The path of brahmajñāna advocated in this book does not require any power of reasoning other than that possessed by the ordinary man; no intellectual gymnastic or any involvement in technicalities of logic is demanded of the aspirant. The procedure followed in this book is based on the common experience of all mankind and does not require any 'supra-rational organon' as claimed by

some who are fond of modern high-sounding jargons which serve only to surround the clear path of brahma-vidyā with mysteries blocking the vision of the seeker.

Some of the matter of the *Talks* has been re-arranged in this edition. Some topics have also been added. All Sanskrit quotations have been transliterated in Roman characters according to the accepted International scheme, a table of which is given at the beginning of the book, and relegated to the footnotes, translations of which have been given in the body of the book. Quotations left untranslated in the first edition have been translated in this edition.

Before closing this preface let me express my heartfelt appreciation of the selfless services of friends who prepared the manuscripts of the book for the press, supervised the printing and corrected the proofs. I refrain from thanking them for their labour of love, out of respect for their dislike to be thanked. I also desire to give expression to my deep appreciation of the fine printing and get-up of the book by the Sharada Press, Mangalore.

Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama }  
 Trichur }  
 26th September 1959 }

SWAMI ISWARANANDA

## Preface to the First Edition

This book seeks to expound the philosophical approach to the realization of Brahman, the absolute Reality, in a very simple and rational way. The technique adopted here may appear novel to many; but, as a matter of fact, the author has only sought to clear the most ancient path trodden by the ṛṣis of the Upaniṣads of over-growths. Mystical approaches and theological doctrines have been so much mixed up with the purely rational method in course of time as to make the latter path disappear, as it were, beneath the former, leaving only a faint streak on the surface to enable it to remind us of the existence of the path of jñānayoga. An attempt is made here to present the brahmavidyā shorn of the mystical and theological accretions. Let scientists, rationalists, atheists, agnostics and materialists see if they have not a philosophy here which will not overstrain their power of reason and which will satisfy their intellect, at the same time be supremely beneficial and practical in their everyday life.

The realization of the philosophy taught in these pages is not such as will absorb the whole energy of man to the exclusion of the activities needed for the maintenance of the individual or social life. The struggle for existence is so keen at the present time as to make people complain that they have little time and energy left for the prolonged religious exercises and mystic absorptions. In this age when every ounce of man's energy, especially in India, has to be spent for acquiring the means of livelihood in a keen struggle for existence, on account of scarcity due to over-population and pressure on material resources, he wants a philosophy and a method of realizing it in everyday life which will release his time and energy for acquisition of those means, after attaining the highest peace, freedom,

knowledge, bliss, love, fearlessness and the certainty of eternal life. Such a philosophy and the method of realizing it are offered to every man in these pages, which will take him to the *summum bonum* of life with the least expenditure of time and energy. May this book be helpful to all seekers of Truth and Reality in all climes and ages.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part consists of expository talks, and the second part is intended for those who want the authority of the scriptures and the great teachers for the standpoint adopted in these talks; in this second part they may have the authority they seek to their fill.

The author is deeply indebted to the donor, who has made a gift of the amount needed for the publication of this book, whose name he is not free to disclose. The sale proceeds of the book will go towards the service of the Sādhus as desired by the donor as well as towards a second edition of the book.

20th July 1953 }  
Trichur }

THE AUTHOR

DEDICATED  
WITH SALUTATIONS

TO

UDDĀLAKA ĀRUṆI

SANATKUMĀRA

YĀJÑAVALKYA

PRAJĀPATI

AJĀTAŚATRU

PIPPALĀDA

ŚAṆKARĀCĀRYA

AND

ALL WHO TAUGHT BRAHMAVIDYĀ  
THROUGH SAMPRASĀDAVIDYĀ

## Note on Transliteration

In this book Devanāgarī characters are transliterated according to the scheme adopted by the International Congress of Orientalists at Athens in 1912 and since then acknowledged to be the only rational and satisfactory one. The scheme of transliteration in full is as follows:

	अ a,	आ ā,	इ i,	ई ī,	उ u,	ऊ ū,
ऋ ṛ,	ॠ ṝ,	ए e,	ओ o,	ऐ ai,	औ au,	ं ṁ,
: ḥ,	क् k,	ख kh,	ग् g,	घ gh,	ङ ṅ,	च् c,
छ ch,	ज् j,	झ jh,	ञ ñ,	ट् ṭ,	ठ् ṭh,	ड् ḍ,
ढ् ḍh,	ण् ṇ,	त् t,	थ् th,	द् d,	ध् dh,	न् n,
प् p,	फ् ph,	ब् b,	भ् bh,	म् m,	य् y,	र् r,
ल् l,	व् v,	श् ś,	ष् ṣ,	स् s,	ह् h.	

### Pronunciation of Transliterated Words.

#### VOWELS

a	<i>sounds like</i>	u	in	sun	i	<i>sounds like</i>	i	in	bid
ā	„	a	„	far	ī	„	ee	„	seed
ai	„	y	„	my	o	„	o	„	no
au	„	ow	„	now	u	„	u	„	bull
e	„	ay	„	say	ū	„	oo	„	cool

#### CONSONANTS

c	<i>sounds like</i>	ch	in	Church	ṛ	<i>sounds like</i>	ru	in	French.
									(midway between roo and ri)
d	„	d	in	French	ś	„	sh		
ḍ	„	d			ṣ	„	sh	(practically)	
g	„	g	in	get	t	„	t	in	French
ḥ	half-articulated	h			ṭ	„	t		
ṁ or ṅ		ing			th	„	th	in	thing
ñ or ṇ n	(practically)				v	„	w		

The rest of the consonants sound as in English.

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# PART ONE

# ARGUMENT

## OM

Know me to be that transcendental Reality, the real Self identified with which an embodied soul (that is fast asleep) experiences by self-intuition the deep sleep and (supreme) felicity in that state.

That consciousness of the embodied soul which while remembering the sleeping and the waking states is aware of itself as the commonground of both, and which could be distinguished from the states, that consciousness is Brahman, the Absolute.

—Bhagavān Ananta to Citraketu  
(*Śrīmad-Bhāgavata*, VI. xvi. 55, 56)

*yena prasuptaḥ puruṣaḥ svāpaṁ vedā 'tmūnas tadā  
sukhaṁ ca nirguṇaṁ brahma tam ātmānam avehi mām ।  
ubhayaṁ smarataḥ puṁsaḥ prasvāpapatibodhayoḥ  
anveti vyatiricyeta taj jñānaṁ brahma tat param ॥*

# God-Realization Through Reason

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The Upaniṣads are the highest authority on Hindu Religion and Philosophy. Their metaphysics has risen to the highest flights of thinking ever achieved by man. The dizzy heights to which the vision of their thinkers and sages soared, have never been surpassed anywhere else in the world. In the Upaniṣads are depicted the sublimest reaches of freedom, fearlessness, bliss and enlightenment to which the soul of man has ever risen. To the suffering, sorrowing, struggling, unhappy race of humanity the Upaniṣads have imparted the knowledge of the secret of peace, bliss and fearlessness, inspired countless generations to strive for the highest and noblest ideals of life, and beckon all humanity to arise, awake and stop not till the goal is reached. These Upaniṣads have declared in unfaltering tones the realization of the Supreme Being as the highest achievement of great seers and sages. Thus spake one of the ṛṣis: 'I have known that Great Being of the brilliance of the sun, beyond all darkness; knowing him alone one crosses over to immortality; there is no other way to the goal, there is no other way.'<sup>1</sup>

The Upaniṣads have taught therefore, that Brahma-jñāna, the realization of the Supreme Being, the One

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<sup>1</sup> *vedāhametaṁ puruṣaṁ mahāntam  
āditya-varṇaṁ tamaśaḥ paraśtāt  
tameva viditvā 'timṛtyumeti  
nā 'nyaḥ panthā vidyate 'yanāya (Śve. U., III. 8).*

without a second, as the sole means of liberation or mokṣa for the human soul.

The question is, how to attain this realization? What are the means and methods? The *Bhagavad-gītā*, the next highest authority of Hinduism has dealt with four yogas: Jñāna (philosophical investigation), dhyāna or abhyāsa (practice of mental control and introspection), bhakti (love of Personal God) and karma (way of dedicated works). We shall be dealing here with the yoga or path of philosophical enquiry as taught in the Upaniṣads. Our object in these talks is to elucidate the fundamentals of the way trodden by the ṛṣis of the Upaniṣads and present the salient features of this yoga as distinguished from other yogas.

It is a remarkable thing that the Upaniṣadic ṛṣis imparted Brahmavidyā not to pundits but to young men who had to unlearn what they had learnt. Of course, these youths had a preparatory training in the control of the mind and the senses, had renunciation, were earnest seekers after Truth and were devoted to the realization of Brahman. To them the ṛṣis of old imparted the highest Truth in the simplest way possible, which, in course of time, falling into the hands of logicians, intellectuals, theologians, ritualists and mystics, had been covered by accretions, non-essential doctrines, and a forest of commentaries, and commentaries upon commentaries, and philosophical jargons, so much so that the student of Vedānta has to grope all his life before he could catch a gleam of light and very often, even this is denied to him by the over-solicitous anxiety of the well-meaning but confirmed believers in and champions of mysticism who, in the name of jñānayoga, the path of philosophy, have reduced it to the art of seeing visions, hearing voices and getting realizations by repetition of

formulas and by the suppression of mental functioning in samādhi. Whatever may be the value and utility of such practices—and we do not mean to deny them—they do not form the essence of jñānayoga, which is pre-eminently the path of vicāra or reason and which has been blazoned by the knowers of Brahman. Neither does this yoga consist in a knowledge of various systems of philosophies and theologies of which the number is legion. No amount of acquaintance with the inexhaustible details of the panorama of world phenomena, the microcosm and the macrocosm, and organizing them into systems will give us that knowledge of the Reality which will save us from the constant fear of the unknown that ever confronts us. Like the proverbial will-o'-the-wisp, the ultimate ever deludes us until most of us abandon the search for knowledge and betake ourselves to the satisfactions and joys offered by mysticism or social service. But he who treads the path of jñānayoga must have the determination or the śraddhā to achieve the goal which, after all, is not so very formidable as the pundits and mystics make us believe. Today the very name Vedānta is dreaded by many, so much so that whatever is difficult to understand and requires complicated ways of reasoning and thinking, is in popular language 'Vedānta'. Why should this be so? Why should Truth be so very difficult to get at? One should have thought it is untruth and error that required to be supported by a thousand props and not truth which is characterised by straightforwardness. Jñānayoga is the path of straightforward thinking, the shortest way to the realization of the ultimate Reality and the easiest of all yogas, and the resultant realization of Advaita, the most comprehensive of all realizations, is the simplest of all philosophical truths which no philosophical system could

ever refute or overthrow. 'To the introspective,' says Śaṅkara, 'with the blessing of a teacher and of one's own self, there is nothing so easy, so well known and so quickly accessible, and so near as this knowledge of Brahman.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the first thing that the aspirant to the realization of Brahman has to do is to get rid of the fear and prejudice against this yoga embedded in their hearts by the teachings of the devotees and the mystics.

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<sup>1</sup> *bāhyākāra-nivṛtta-buddhīnām tu labdha-gurvātma-prasā-dānām na ataḥ param sukham suprasiddham suvijñeyam svā-sannataram asti (Gītā-bhāṣya, XVIII, 50).*

## 2. A STUDY OF THE KNOWER AND THE KNOWN

### *Analytic and Synthetic Reasoning*

The goal of jñānayoga is the realization of the ultimate Reality (Brahman) by knowing which everything becomes known, *yajjñātvā sarvam idaṁ vijñātaṁ bhavati*. There are two assertions implied in this: First, that there is only one ultimate Reality; second, that everything can be known. Are these assertions true, or are they mere assumptions? Jñānayoga proposes to answer these questions to the entire satisfaction of the questioner.

The starting point in jñānayoga is the question: What is this world and who am I? 'Aham' and 'Idam', 'I' and 'this', the two categories in our experience, are the objects of investigation; and when these have been thoroughly investigated we will have attained the goal of jñānayoga. Nothing more will remain to be known; for, these are the only contents of our experience—I, the knower and this, the known. We first start with self-analysis asking the question, 'Who am I?' The Self is immediately intuited in our experience, is pratyak. No one can doubt that one exists.

If anyone doubts the existence of the Self, then the seer of the doubt is the Self. Who then am I? Am I a body and mind as is usually supposed? This conviction is so deep-rooted that I hardly doubt it. But I have to start with this very question of my own nature. Along with the consciousness of 'I', I have the consciousness of 'this' also, something other than 'I'. I know that I am not this paper; I am convinced of this fact. Why? Because it is an object of experience, because it is known to the knower 'I'. For the same reason, I am compelled

to conclude that I am not this body, neither am I the senses, nor the mind, because they are known to me, the knower. They are other than myself. The knower and the known, the seer and the seen, the *dr̥k* and the *dr̥śya* cannot be the same. It is on this ground that I am not this paper. It is on the very same ground that I am not the body or the mind. Even the ego-sense of I, being only a modification of the mind, which is experienced as an object, is other than the real I, and is seen as an object along with the body, the mind and the world of senses. The real I then is simply, the Knower, Consciousness itself set against which is the world of insentient nature including my body and mind. The fact that I talk of 'my' body and 'my' mind implies that I have some vague idea of these being other than myself and which I can possess as I possess my umbrella or shoe. In this way, all our world of experience could be analysed into the categories of Self and non-Self following our present cognition of 'I' and 'this' and pushing it to its ultimate logical possibility. This is the first step in Vedāntic reasoning and ends in the discovery of the real I, the Self as Pure Consciousness or *cit*, the essence of knowledge. This, the *ātman* does not require any proof whatever. For, if there is any proof required for its existence, the proof has to be certified by the Self itself. Therefore, the Self, Consciousness, is fundamental in all our experience.

A series of interesting conclusions follow from this. None of the qualities and properties and functions and states of the world of objects belong to me the knower, nor do they affect me. Not being the body, I am not subject to hunger or thirst. I have no disease, no growth or decay, neither birth nor death. I am not white or black, neither ugly nor beautiful. I am neither male nor female, I have no sex. I am no father or mother, I am

no son, or daughter, I am no husband or wife, brother or sister, for these relations are derived through the body of which I am only the knower. Nor am I the doer of any action; I neither drink nor eat, neither walk nor sit, neither weep nor laugh, neither write nor speak; for these are only the functions of the body. Not being the senses, I neither see nor hear, neither do I smell nor taste nor touch. Not being the mind, I am not the thinker or the doubter or the questioner, or the enquirer or the judge, or a philosopher or a poet or a mathematician. I am neither dull nor intelligent, neither a fool nor a genius. I am the Pure Consciousness which simply reveals the activities of the mind. I am, therefore, neither happy nor unhappy, neither proud nor humble, these being only states of the mind. I am neither a Christian nor a Hindu, nor a Muslim nor a Jew nor a Zoroastrian, these being only the mind's ideas of my social or religious affiliations. My body may be born of Indian, Chinese, British or Negro parents, but being only the Seer of the body, I am neither an Indian nor a Chinaman nor a Britisher nor a Negro. I have no country, I am only the Seer of all countries. I therefore, do not belong to any country, nor does any country belong to me. 'Mine' is only a mental modification which comes and goes and relates itself to different objects and persons and places at different times. As the body and mind do not hold me, as I am only their Seer and so outside them, I am not limited by them. I am outside nature; I am not in space, I am the Seer of space and also of time. I am, therefore, unlimited by time or space. Time and space, their existence being revealed by me, have no support nor locus except in me, the consciousness that knows them. I am infinite and the whole world exists in me. I could not have been born, for if anything comes into existence

either from a state of existence or even from non-existence I must have been there to know it; nor can it be supposed that I will die or go into non-existence or into some other state of existence, for I must be there as the unchanging witness to see the changes. I am unchanging, eternal, unborn and immortal. Birth or death does not belong to me. Being ever unchanging and of the same nature even when everything else may change, I am eternally peaceful and beyond all wants, anxieties, cares, desires, miseries or fear; for these are only states and modifications of the mind. I am unqualified existence, knowledge absolute and bliss unalloyed—*so 'ham! so 'ham!* I am the sole support of the universe; the universe exists because I reveal its existence, I am Pure Consciousness, the Self. 'He shining, everything else shines. All these are revealed by his self-effulgence.'<sup>1</sup> Such is my glorious and majestic Self. These are the startling conclusions we come to by the process of *dr̥ḡya-viveka*, discrimination between the Self and the non-Self, the seer and the seen.

This process of reasoning ends in dualism, the duality of the Self and the non-Self. This is the point where the Sāṅkhya system climbed up to, but where it stopped. It did not go further than reducing the multiplicity of experience into two ultimate categories of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, each of which was equally real and mutually exclusive. This process of analytical reasoning is called *vyatirekin* reasoning and ends in the dualism of spirit and matter.

Vedānta would not stop there. It puts the question: What is this non-Self, the world of *dr̥ḡya*, the so-called

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<sup>1</sup> *tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvām  
tasya bhāsū sarvām idaṁ vibhāti (Muṇḍ. U., II. ii. 11).*

world of insentient matter and mind? By the first process of reasoning, we have known the Self. It has not told us what the non-Self is, and unless this is answered, we have not known all that is to be known.

And of what use is this knowledge of duality of the Self and the body, asks Vedānta.<sup>1</sup> Hence the second process of reasoning known as anvayin, synthetic, by which we come to the knowledge that all this is the Self, *ātmai've'dam sarvam*. That which was first rejected as non-Self, the world of *dṛśya* is known at the end of this process as nothing other than the Self. The Self being thus without a second, nothing more will remain to be known. Says Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa: 'He (Īśvarakoṭi) follows the process of negation and affirmation. First he negates the world realising that it is not Brahman, but then he affirms the same world as the manifestation of Brahman. To give an illustration, a man wanting to climb to the roof first negates the stairs as not being the roof, but on reaching the roof he finds that the stairs are made of the same materials as the roof—bricks, lime and brickdust. Then he can either move up and down the stairs, or remain on the roof as he pleases' (*Gospel of Śrī Rāmakṛṣṇa*, Page 635).

Says Śaṅkara: 'By analytic reasoning one reaches the ultimate cause of the universe and by synthetic reasoning that very same cause is seen always in the effect.'<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *ity ātmadehabhāgena prapañcasyai 'va satyatā  
yatho 'ktā tarkaśāstreṇa tataḥ kim puruṣārthatā.*

(*Aparokṣānubhūti*, 41)

<sup>2</sup> *kāraṇam vyatirekeṇa pumān ādau vilokayet  
anvayena punastad hi kārye nityam prapaśyati.*

(*Aparokṣānubhūti*, 138)

The śāstras have taught that the first stage of realization is the knowledge of the difference between the Self and the non-Self. This is accompanied by the ideas of reality and unreality *i.e.*, the Self as real and the non-Self as unreal. In the second stage the knowledge of Brahman is of two forms in accordance with experience and reason. The first is due to the previous identification of the Self with the body and is of the nature, 'I am Brahman', that is to say, not the body, and the other is when I know the Self is all this and is of the nature 'All this is Brahman'.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *ātmānātmapratītiḥ prathamam abhīhitā satyamithyātva-yogāt dvedhā brahmapratītir nigamanigaditā svānubhūtyopapatyā. ādyā dehānubandhād bhavati tadaparā sā ca sarvātmakatvāt ādau brahmā 'ham asmī 'ty anubhava udite khalvidaṁ brahma paścāt (Śataslokī, 3).*

### 3. NON-DUALITY IN DREAMLESS SLEEP

How then do I know that 'all this is the Self'? Here, again, we start with experience, anubhava, a significant experience. It is nothing but our everyday experience of dreamless sleep, suṣupti. We hardly give a thought to the nature of this experience except to say, 'I had a very profound or pleasant sleep'. We dismiss it then and there, and take no more thought of it; but the ṛṣis of old, the seers of the Upaniṣads, considered this experience as a treasure of gold over which we pass up and down every-day of our life without ever suspecting the existence of an invaluable treasure under our feet (*Chānd. U., VIII. 3*). This unique experience is being neglected by us as something of no consequence except for the rest of the body and mind it affords. But to the ṛṣis this experience was of great philosophical significance, and on this has been grounded the saving Truth of Advaita and the reality of the non-dual Brahman.

What then is this experience? What happens to this world and my personality as Mr so-&-so in deep sleep? We say, 'I did not know anything in sleep'. I am now sure that the world of objects including my personality with body, mind and ego was not experienced. Nothing of the dr̥śyaprapaṅca, the world of objects of the waking or dream states, was present in my consciousness. Why? Was it that consciousness itself was non-existent in deep sleep? That could not be; for if consciousness were absent, there could not have been now the memory that, 'all this' of the waking state was not experienced then. This is not an inference. If I did not see a lion this morning, but was reminded of this fact when I saw one in the evening, I do not say that I 'inferred' that I had not seen the lion in the morning. It was a fact of experience. But then,

I existed in the morning and I know it from memory, so that I can now vouch for the fact that I did not then see the lion, though I had not the idea then that I was not seeing the lion; (for to have such an experience, no idea is necessary). Thus then, my existence as consciousness in deep sleep could not be doubted. *na hi vijñātur vijñāter viparilopo vidyate (Br. U.)*. It is that consciousness that is now bearing witness to the fact that this world was not experienced. What could be the reason for it? Shall we suppose that a screen of ignorance, avidyā invaded my consciousness and so the world of non-Self was hidden from my consciousness? That cannot be; for, if the screen of ignorance were present, it should have been known to consciousness as present before it as a second entity other than itself. (If I do not see an object before me on account of a screen, I cannot avoid seeing the screen itself.) But this is contradicted by our experience, of which we say, 'I did not see anything'. If ignorance were present as an object, our verdict would be, 'I knew ignorance in deep sleep'; but this nobody says. And if I knew a second entity, then I must have been waking or dreaming. In these states we experience ignorance, but certainly not in deep sleep in which no object, gross or subtle, dark or white, is experienced, as different from the Self.

Where then was this world? Was it remaining in some subtle state, say, like a tree in a seed? If it were, then, it could have been witnessed by the ever-present consciousness. Whoever hath seen the world-seed in dreamless sleep? We say, 'I knew nothing in deep sleep'. Therefore, the fact that nothing other than the Self existed in *suṣupti* is an incontrovertible conclusion. 'There the seer alone existed, one without a second, like one mass of water.'<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *salila eko draṣṭā advaito bhavati (Br. U., IV. iii. 32)*.

Where then was this world? The seers of the Upaniṣads say that the world existed then as non-different from the Self. To see another, to know another, there must be that second entity. Without a second entity beside itself, how can the Self know it? If then the world was not seen by the Self, that was because the world remained as the Self. The reasoning is clear and simple. This second process is known as anvayin or the synthetic process.

Was not the world then the Self in the previous waking state? And is not the world even now, in this waking state, the Self? Is not the world always the ātman? Yes, it is so. All this is always ātman: *atmai've'daṁ sarvam*. All this is Brahman: *sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ brahma*. There are not many here: *ne'ha nānā'sti kiñcana*. There is only one without a second: *ekam evādvitīyaṁ brahma*. The whole universe, therefore, is nothing but pure consciousness, cit, the Self that 'I am'. We have answered the second question: What is this world? This realization known as sarvātmabhāva is the supreme goal of Vedāntic investigation and attainment, the highest state of freedom, fearlessness, desirelessness and bliss. This is the realization of Brahman, brahmajñāna.

#### 4. WHAT IS REASONING?

Now let us turn back and examine our steps. We started with the anubhava or experience of the waking state, in which the 'I' is pitted against the 'non-I'. Consciousness of duality is the essential feature of the waking experience. What is implied in this consciousness is the axiom that the experiencer and the experienced are not the same. The experienced must be different from and other than the experiencer in order to be experienced. We apply this axiom to our cognition of our body and mind and realize the truth that these are not the real 'I', the experiencer. What we have done is simply to make explicit what has been implicit in our ordinary experience of objects. The anubhava was there, but the jñāna, the knowledge, that we are not the body or the mind, that we are the dr̥k, the pure consciousness, was not there. Why were we ignorant of this truth? Because we never thought of the implications of our experience; we have not reasoned. That which has made us conscious of the truth in terms of ideas such as 'I am the pure consciousness other than the body and the mind and the ego' is the process of reasoning. And *by reason is meant the process by which that which is implicit in experience is made explicit in terms of thought.* For millions of generations men saw apples falling, but only a Newton reasoned and brought out the implications of that experience in terms of thought, and thus realized the truth of gravitation. That the earth is round is not patent to us until we have put together a number of our experiences and made explicit what is implied in these experiences. The judge comes to the conclusion that so-&-so is a criminal by putting together various pieces of evidence and educing, as it were, what is already implied in the facts of evidence before him which

is the sum total of his experience. The logician argues: All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is mortal. The conclusion is nothing but an explicit statement of what is implied in the premises. Yet the association of mortality with Socrates is the new piece of knowledge gained by this reasoning. Anubhava is, therefore, not tantamount to jñāna. Jñāna is the result of vicāra or reasoning on experience. *vicārād anyasādhanaḥ bodho (tattvabodho) na jāyate (Atmabodha)*. All jñāna or knowledge is experience; but all anubhava or experience is not knowledge.

## 5. REALIZATION OF BRAHMAN ONLY IN TERMS OF THOUGHT

The same technique is now applied to answer the question, what is the world of non-Self, the world of *dr̥syaprapaṅca*? Of the many experiences we have, *suṣṭpti* is the one experience which will answer this question and is therefore of special significance. We simply make explicit what is already implied in that experience. That experience is non-dual, where the non-self of the waking state was not experienced as other than the Self, or as having an independent existence. It was the Self alone that remained, the Self that reveals the existence, if any, of a second entity, as its very nature is never-failing consciousness. The world of the waking state is, therefore, a mirage, as it were, on the desert of the *ātman*, which mirage disappeared for a time and this gap in our experience of the waking and dream states is *suṣṭpti*. But the implications of this experience, the truth of the non-dual existence, could not be realized in that state by the very nature of that experience; for in the absence of the thinking instrument, the mind, as a separate entity from the Self, no thought in the form, 'All this is the Self' is possible. The realization of this truth is possible only on reflection in the waking state when the mind is present, or in the dream state also, if you please, which is not fundamentally different from the waking. 'All this is the Self', 'All this is Brahman', 'There are not many here', &c. are forms of thought, they are *vṛtti-jñāna*. *Vṛtti* is possible only in the waking and therefore, *brahmajñāna* is possible only in the waking, whereas *brahmānubhava* is what obtains in deep sleep. When the implications of *brahmānubhava* are made explicit in terms of thought by *vicāra* or reasoning, we get *brahmajñāna*. There is no such thing

as realization of Brahman other than, brahmānubhava or brahmajñāna. ‘The śrutis themselves declare that this dualistic universe is but a delusion, and that in reality it is non-dual. This is directly experienced in dreamless sleep.’<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *māyāmātram idaṁ dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ iti brūte śrutih sākṣāt suṣuptāvanubhūyate (Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, 405).*

## 6. REASON AND LOGIC DISTINGUISHED

Reason is not logic. Logic is concerned with formal truth, not material truth. For example, if you once admit that all men are fools and Socrates is a man, then you are bound to conclude that Socrates is a fool. Logic does not enquire into the truth or otherwise of the premise, 'All men are fools', nor into the conclusion, 'Socrates is a fool'. And yet the conclusion is perfectly logical. Logic can build anything upon assumptions, unverified premises; and whole philosophical structures have been built upon assumptions without any foundations in facts of experience, and which could not therefore be verified. These systems have remained as mere theoretical structures, playthings for the imagination of university intellectuals and pundits. The truth of Advaita is not built upon gymnastics of logic or upon the fancies of imagination. It is based upon experience and its interpretation. The jñānayogin must be a thorough rationalist and should not be trapped into the treacherous pits of dry logic, śuṣkatarka or kevalatarka unsupported by anubhava. The tarka or reasoning which the jñānayogin adopts is in the words of Śaṅkara, 'reasoning based on experience' (*anubhavāṅgatvena tarkaḥ*) which alone will take him to Truth.

## 7. THE CONTENT OF SAMĀDHI AND SUṢUPTI EXPERIENCES THE SAME

What is really wanting is not the experience of Brahman or ātman; for the Self is immediately intuited by all—in the waking state as conditioned by the limiting adjuncts of the body, mind and various kinds of relationships and ideas superimposed on the ātman and in deep sleep completely free from all these. The intuition of deep sleep is timeless, spaceless and mindless; in fact it is pure sentiency, jñapti. It is objectless intuition or awareness without any object to be aware of, or Pure Consciousness. However much one may meditate or withdraw oneself, one cannot go beyond the Self. Therefore the real work to be done is the removal of the superimpositions through discrimination and by understanding the implications of the non-dual experience of deep sleep. But there are many who on account of its being a free gift of Nature do not consider it of any value higher than that of physical and mental relaxation and rest. Sleep comes to us unsought; we are so familiar with it; and that is why we do not give a thought to it. There is the English proverb, 'Familiarity breeds contempt' and the Indian proverb, 'The jasmine in your courtyard has no smell'. Such people are not satisfied with the Ganges water which flows by the side of their own house, but want to dig a well of their own on the bank with great effort. They too will surely get water after which alone their thirst will be satisfied. For such people the dhyānayogins or rājayogins have prescribed the aṣṭāṅga-yoga leading to the suppression of all mental modifications and withdrawal of consciousness from the physical body (jaḍa-samādhi or nirvikalpa-samādhi). But the man in samādhi of this kind gets no more realization of the

Absolute than the one in deep sleep, just as the man who digs the well gets nothing but water.

The attainment of the Absolute in samādhi is valuable to the yogin on account of the trouble taken, pains undergone and effort put forth to attain it whereas the same got in suṣupti having come to him without any effort is of little or no value. It is one of the accepted principles of economics that value is determined by the amount of labour spent on the commodity; that seems to be applicable here also.

## 8. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUṢUPTI AND SAMĀDHI

Is there then no difference between suṣupti and samādhī? If by samādhī is meant in this context, the non-dual experience, then there is absolutely no difference between the two from the standpoint of the experiencing consciousness. The śruti says with reference to the experience of suṣupti: 'The seer remains alone, one without a second like a mass of water.'<sup>1</sup> Does the man in samādhī get an experience different from this? But from the standpoint of an onlooker and from the standpoint of the persons who have come out of these states and have fallen into the waking state, a difference could be made out, or is made out between the mental conditions of the two on the supposition that minds existed in samādhī and suṣupti. I say, 'on the supposition', for, no mind is experienced as such in samādhī or suṣupti. The existence of the mind in these states is a mere inference in the waking state, but contradicted by experience. For, both of them coming out of their experiences report that they knew nothing in these states. It is, therefore, on the supposition that there is mind in these states that a difference could be made out between suṣupti and samādhī.

Well, then, the difference may be stated to be like the difference between the body-postures and conditions of two men in deep sleep—one standing and the other lying. The one lying on a bed is completely relaxed; the one standing has all his muscles and nerves thoroughly under control and therefore is in a tense state. Now, neither of them knows anything about his body in sleep. Their experiences do not differ; but when they come out of sleep,

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<sup>1</sup> *salīla eko draṣṭā advaito bhavati (Br. U., IV. iii. 32).*

one finds his body standing as it was before he went to sleep; the other finds his body lying in bed as it was before sleep. The former infers that his body continued to be standing and the latter that his body continued to be lying in bed; but neither of them had any knowledge of his body in the sleep-state itself. As such the experience of the one could not be distinguished from that of the other. The difference, therefore, is only from the standpoint of the body. But we are not concerned with the state of the body when we enquire into the actual experience of the two. It is of no consequence in this context. Similarly, the state of mind, *manaḥ-pracāra*, of the one who has undergone yogic discipline and has attained *cittavṛtti-nirodha* or complete suppression of the mind-modification, may be different from the relaxed state of the undisciplined mind of a person in ordinary sleep. It is this state of discipline and control which is valuable in the practice of yoga and not the state of complete forgetfulness which follows the suppression and which could not be distinguished from the complete forgetfulness, *sarvavismṛti*, or complete non-cognition, *sarva-agrahaṇa*, of the *suṣṭi* state; because this we get in the latter state, Śāṅkara has defined *samādhi* as 'Complete forgetfulness of all *vṛttis*'.<sup>1</sup> When the man comes out of *samādhi*, he gets back again the pre-*samādhi* controlled state of mind. He, therefore, infers that his mind continued to be *niruddha* or controlled in *samādhi* also; whereas the man coming out of *suṣṭi* infers that his mind continued to exist submerged or *līna* even as it was before he lost sight of it. But of what consequence is this to me except to know that if my mind is controlled in the waking state, I may get it back in the

<sup>1</sup> *vṛtti-vismaraṇam samyak samādhirjñānasamjñakah.*

(*Aparokṣānubhūti*, 124)

same way in the next waking state, and if uncontrolled, I may get it back uncontrolled—the forgetfulness of sleep or samādhi making no difference in the content of one's experience in those states. If, then, the samādhi under discussion is a case of non-dual experience, the difference in the poise of the supposed minds does not bring about additional knowledge or realization any more than what obtains in suṣupti. But with the knowledge of non-duality gained in a previous waking state, the man coming out of samādhi experiences this knowledge again in the waking when he experiences his mind. If he was ignorant, he continues to be ignorant even after samādhi, even though his mind is thoroughly disciplined, controlled and concentrated, for no knowledge of Truth or Reality is gained where there is no mind. This is true of deep sleep as well; a fool comes out of sleep as a fool and a knower of Brahman as a knower of Brahman.

## 9. IS SLEEP A MODIFICATION OF THE MIND?

Indirectly this is a rejection of the yogic definition of *suṣupti*: *abhāvapratyayālamḃanā vṛttir nidrā*. That sleep is a mental modification resting on the idea of non-existence is unacceptable to Vedānta. The Vedāntin asks: who hath seen this mental modification or idea of absence of things of the waking state? If there is the presence of such a *vṛtti* it would have been immediately known as an object to the witness which is always consciousness itself. When an idea such as 'I am not seeing an elephant' occurs to me, that idea is immediately known and could be remembered. But if I am asked, 'Did you see an elephant this morning?' and I reply, 'No', it does not imply that I had any such idea of the absence of the elephant in my mind before the question was put to me. Therefore, the inference that such a *vṛtti* existed all along is wrong. In fact, absence or presence of any elephant was not at all thought of by me. Similarly the absence of any thought about the universe of the waking state is a matter of experience, which is called deep sleep and this is remembered in the waking state by contrast. Deep sleep is, therefore, total forgetfulness (*sarvaviśmṛti*) of all objects including the mind and its *vṛttis*. Therefore the conclusion of the Vedānta that 'The Self alone exists, One without a second' is a bare statement of experience and it is pointing to this witness which is present even now in the waking state that the śruti teaches *tat tvam asi*.

## 10. REALIZATION THROUGH VICĀRA OR SAMĀDHI?

Some students of the scriptures make a distinction between knowing and realizing. They believe that that which is arrived at through reason has to be realized later on by meditation. They are right if they mean by reason only second-hand knowledge got at through inference or the experience of other people, parokṣajñāna. They have to resort to imagination in order to harmonise their present experience in the waking state with the second-hand knowledge heard from those who have realized the Truth. Their knowledge is only theoretical or indirect, only intellectual, but the knowledge obtained by the application of reason to one's own experience can never be theoretical. The knowledge of Advaita when obtained as a result of the right interpretation of the advaya experience of deep sleep can never be theoretical or indirect; being based on one's own experience it is direct or aparokṣa; for, as Śāṅkara says: 'We on the other hand do want to prove that the Brahman is the lasting abode of the soul in the state of deep sleep; that is a knowledge which has its own uses, viz., the ascertainment of Brahman being the Self of the soul and the ascertainment of the Soul being essentially unconnected with the worlds that appear in the waking and dreaming states. Hence the Self alone is the place of deep sleep.'<sup>1</sup> And by reasoning on this experience, one attains ātma-*lābha* or the realization of the Self. 'By reasoning of

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<sup>1</sup> *brahma tu anapāyī suptisthānam ity etad pratipādayāmah.  
tena tū vijñānena prayojanam asti. jīvasya brahmātmatvāva-  
dhāraṇam svapnajāgarita-vyavahāra-vimuktatvāvadhāraṇam ca  
tasmūl ātmaiva suptisthānam.*

(Śāṅkara's *Sūtra-bhāṣya*, III. ii. 7)

the latter type (reasoning leading to realization) we may, for instance, arrive at the following conclusions: that because the state of dream and the waking state exclude each other, the Self is not connected with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is Pure Being, it has for its self Pure Being apart from the phenomenal world; that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separated from Brahman according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect',<sup>1</sup> Śaṅkara in the commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* has insisted that deep sleep is an experience of mokṣa itself. *tasmād samprasādasthānaṁ mokṣa-dṛṣṭāntabhūtam* (IV. iii. 34). That is why reasoning on this experience in the waking state leads to direct realization of mokṣa and sarvātmabhāva. On the otherhand Śaṅkara has condemned the wisdom or pāṇḍitya of those who believe thus: "Kṣetrajña is Īśvara himself; but kṣetra is different from the kṣetrajña and is the object of experience for the kṣetrajña. But I am a bound soul with happiness and unhappiness as my lot. I am to get rid of my bondage by discriminating between the Self and the non-Self and then I shall get a direct vision of the Lord by becoming kṣetrajña by meditation? He who knows thus and he who teaches thus, neither of them is the Self. Whoever thinks thus is the meanest of pundits, deluding himself with the thought

<sup>1</sup> *śrutyanugrahīta eva hi atra tarkaḥ anubhavāṅgatvena āśrīyate. svapnānta-buddhāntayor ubhayor itaretara-vyabhicārād ātmano ananvāgatatvaṁ, samprasāde ca prapañca-parityāgena sadātmanā sampatter niṣprapañca-sadātmatvaṁ, prapañcasya brahmaprabhavatvāt kāryakāraṇānanyatva-nyāyena brahmāvvyatireka ity evaṁ jātīyakaḥ.*

(Śaṅkara's *Sūtra-bhāṣya*, II. i. 6)

that he has found out the meaning of saṁsāra, mokṣa, and the śāstras dealing with them. Such a man is the murderer of the Self; himself blind, he deludes others also by his ignorance of the traditional knowledge of the scriptures. He murders the scriptures and imposes his own imagination in the place of what is taught in them. Such a man, even though he may be learned in all the scriptures, on account of his ignorance of the traditional technique is to be rejected as an ignorant person.<sup>1</sup> Practising the repetition of a formula such as, 'I am Brahman', 'All this is Brahman' is of as much use as repeating 'I am abracadabra', 'All this is abracadabra' in the case of one who has not understood the meaning of Brahman from one's own experience. One who has never experienced tooth-ache cannot form an idea of it, nor can one who never had an experience of non-duality ever formulate the idea 'All this is Brahman'.

That the meaning of the mahāvākya (Upaniṣadic grand text) *tat tvam asi* (Thou art That) can be realized only by referring to the experience of deep sleep is emphasised by Śaṅkara in the *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasāra-saṅgraha*. After showing that the individual soul (jīva)

<sup>1</sup> *idaṁ ca anyat pāṇḍityaṁ keṣūñcit astu—kṣetrajña īśvara eva. kṣetraṁ ca anyat kṣetrajñasyai'va viśayaḥ. ahaṁ tu saṁsārī sukhī dukhī ca. saṁsāropamaś ca mama kartavyaḥ kṣetra-kṣetrajñāvijñānena, dhyaṇena ca īśvaraṁ kṣetrajñaṁ sūkṣāt-krtvā tat svarūpāvasthānena iti. yaś ca evaṁ buddhyate, yaś ca bodhayati, na asau kṣetrajña iti.*

*evaṁ manvānaḥ yaḥ saḥ paṇḍitūpasadaḥ, saṁsāra-mokṣa-yoḥ śāstrasya ca arthavattvaṁ karomī 'ti; ātmahā ca; svayam mūdhaḥ anyāṁśca vyāmohayati śāstrārthasampradāyarahitatvāt-śrutahānim, aśrutakatpanāṁ ca kurvan. tasmāt asaṁpradāyavit sarvaśāstravid api mūrkhavad eva upekṣoṇīyaḥ.*

(*Gītā-bhāṣya*, XIII. 2).

with his limiting adjuncts, upādhis, cannot be the same as the personal God, Īśvara, with his unlimited adjuncts and therefore the mantra cannot be accepted at its face-value on account of obvious contradictions, the ācārya says:

‘In the sense of the One Undivided Existence, the meaning is acceptable to the śruti. In order to establish the non-duality of Brahman, the śruti declares the identity of the self and Brahman in the passage.<sup>1</sup> “All this has the self as its substratum” *after having shown that self alone exists in deep sleep and that it is non-different from Brahman*, and that, therefore, this extended universe is in essence Pure Existence only. Where is non-duality in Brahman, when the soul and the universe are seen? Therefore, their *infinity* and *identity* are acceptable to the śruti. The obvious contradictions in the apparent meaning of the mantra are thereby removed, and it does not also contradict the śruti’ (*Vide* verses 728 to 753). Earlier in verses 703, 704 and 705 Śaṅkara points out that right knowledge results from ascertaining the meaning of the śruti text: ‘So long as the meaning of “That” and “Thou” are not reflected upon, one will remain in bondage and misery. But liberation, of the nature of Existence-Knowledge-Bliss Absolute, will be attained *by understanding the meaning of the mantra from one’s own experience directly*’.

Some yogins believe that brahmajñāna takes place in the state of nirvikalpa-samādhi. We have seen that there is self-contradiction in this belief, for vṛtti and absence of vṛtti cannot be experienced at the same moment. Hence, the belief demands an explanation. We think that the yogin fails to remember that he has reasoned out his knowledge immediately after samādhi. After all, there is

<sup>1</sup> *sa ya eṣo aṇimaitadātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyaṁ sa ātmā tat tvam asi śvetaketo (Chānd. U., VI. viii. 7).*

only a single step of reasoning from brahmānubhava to brahmajñāna. The yogin's mind may so rapidly pass over this reasoning that he may take the knowledge arrived at as having happened in the nirvikalpa itself. The nirvikalpa experience being also the basis for the knowledge, his legitimate claim that brahmajñāna is the *result* of nirvikalpa is modified into the statement that the jñāna takes place *in* samādhi. The statement also is not far from truth as the knowledge takes place, as it were, on the very brink of experience. When we say that London is on the Thames, it does not mean that the city is on the waters of the river. We mean only that it is on the banks of the river. In the same way we have to understand that it is only an approximate statement of the mystics that they have their brahmajñāna in nirvikalpa-samādhi.

The curd when left undisturbed does not yield its butter, but requires to be churned before the butter can come to the surface. So also the experience of nirvikalpa has to be churned by the rod of reason before it can yield the truth that remains implicit in it. The yogin may overlook and slur over this process and lay all emphasis on the experience itself. The difference between brahmānubhava and brahmajñāna is too subtle to be easily observed and distinguished. Hence the belief that the samādhi in itself is a state of enlightenment which is not the view of vedāntins like Śaṅkara.

If cittavṛttinirodha were a state of knowledge, it would be a contradiction in terms, for vṛttinirodha cannot co-exist with knowledge. The mind does not function, and no knowledge in the form, 'I am Brahman' or 'All this is Brahman', is possible. Such knowledge is the result of reasoning on the experience of samādhi or suṣupti, both of which require to be supplemented by vicāra in order to gain the realization of the truth of Advaita in the waking

state. The fundamental reason why advaita-samādhi could not be distinguished from suṣupti is that in neither of these is there particularised knowledge or viśeṣavijñāna. Two states of viśeṣavijñāna or particularised knowledge can be compared or distinguished from each other; but two states of nirviśeṣavijñāna, non-particularised consciousness or awareness can never be distinguished from each other.

The practice of concentration can be and should be a preparatory sādhana or spiritual discipline in so far as it fashions the instrument with which the jñānin has to reason. Yoga, therefore, should be practised, though the forgetfulness which follows the complete suppression of mental modification is of no greater worth to the jñāna-yogin than his suṣupti. But without vicāra there can be no knowledge of the Truth, no enlightenment.

The definition of yoga is cittavṛttinirodha, the suppression of all modifications of the mind. When all modifications are suppressed, no trace of any modification or vṛtti can be supposed to exist. If any is seen to exist, then the nirodha or suppression is not complete. When it is completed, how could it differ from complete forgetfulness of all vṛttis as in suṣupti? The difference is only in the conditions which led to either and the definitions also are based on such conditions, the contents of the two experiences remaining identical.

Again ādvaita-samādhi also may be of two kinds—these also based on the previous conditions, processes and states of mind:

1. It may be the result of mechanical cittavṛtti-nirodha or deliberate suppression of mind; the yogin may not have attained through reasoning to enlightenment or knowledge of the Truth, 'All this is the Self', and therefore may come out of it without that knowledge.

2. It may be the result of absorption in the idea,

‘All this is the Self’ which knowledge one has attained through reasoning on the experience of avasthātraya. The tendency of this knowledge is to negate ‘all this’ and get absorbed in the Self. When the absorption is complete, the Self alone remains, and ‘all this’ is forgotten. Vṛttivismaraṇa takes place. As this samādhi is brought about by absorption in the knowledge ‘All this is ātman’ or ‘I am Brahman’ it is known as jñānasamādhi. Says Śaṅkara in *Aparokṣānubhūti*: ‘Remaining identified with pure Existence, with the idea “I am Brahman” which gives us supreme bliss is known as dhyāna. Following this takes place what is called jñānasamādhi in which there is no vṛtti, or which is the same as the form (or nature) of Brahman which is brought about by the complete forgetfulness of the vṛtti “I am Brahman”. Vṛttivismaraṇa is the essential condition of nirvikalpa; for this is not brought about without forgetting all vṛttis. And when all vṛttis are forgotten, it is the same as suṣupti; as suṣupti is total forgetfulness (sarvavismṛti), total non-cognition (sarvagrahaṇa). If no knowledge can arise in suṣupti, no knowledge can arise in nirvikalpa-samādhi also. Therefore, for jñānasamādhi knowledge of the form ‘I am Brahman’ should have risen earlier by reasoning on the experience of cittavṛtti-nirodha or suṣupti. There<sup>fore</sup> vṛttinirodha in itself is not productive of jñāna any more than vṛttivismaraṇa of suṣupti as both are identical in their content.

## 11. DOES SUPPRESSION OF MIND LEAD TO LIBERATION?

For the above reason, that is to say, as it is not in itself productive of jñāna, suppression of the modifications of the mind or vṛttinirodha does not lead to liberation. Even if it is said that jñāna will give rise to a continuous flow of mind-modification reflecting the nature of the self and excluding other vṛttis, finally leading to vṛttinirodha or samādhi, there can be no objection to that. Let it be so. It only proves that jñāna is not the result of vṛttinirodha. On the other hand, it only proves that vṛttinirodha might be the result of jñāna. Regarding this, says Śāṅkara: 'If it is contended that nirodha might have some other purpose, and therefore might be the subject of an injunction, over and above the knowledge of the Self gained through an understanding of the meaning of Vedic texts, even then, it is not known to be a means for the attainment of mokṣa, because in the Upaniṣads no other means than the knowledge of the self as Brahman is declared to be the means for the attainment of the *summum bonum* of life. Then again, there is this fact that for nirodha there is no other means than ātmavijñāna, for there is no other means for nirodha than the continuous flow of thought *arising from self-knowledge*. But, this is only a concession. In fact, there is no other means for mokṣa than brahmajñāna.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *nirodhas tarhi arthāntaram iti cet: athāpi syāt cittavṛtti-nirodhasya vedavūkyajanitātmavijñānāt arthāntaratvāt. tantr-āntareṣu ca kartavyatayā avagatatvāt vidheyatvam iti cet nā, mokṣasādhanatvena anavagamāt. na hi vedānteṣu brahmātma-vijñānāt anyat paramapuruṣārthasādhanatvena avagamya . . . ananyasādhanatvāt ca nirodhasya. na hi ātmavijñāna-tatsmṛti-santānavyatirekeṇa cittavṛttinirodhasya sādhanam asti. abhy-upagamyā idam uktam na tu brahmavijñānavyatirekeṇa anyat mokṣasādhanam avagamya (Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya, I. iv. 7).*

## 12. HOW DID THE MANY COME OUT OF THE ONE?

Here is a pertinent question in this connection. If the world had remained non-different from the Self in deep sleep as knowers of Brahman assert, how did it come out again as an object of experience? The same may be put in another way: How did the many or the multiplicity of the waking experience come out of the unitary experience of deep sleep? Again, it is the same question as: How did the world come out of Brahman, or how did creation take place, or what caused creation? The answer is: This world was and is Pure Consciousness. If you do not see it thus it is due to avidyā, nescience. This avidyā is usually present in the waking and dream states. Its nature is indefinable, anirvacanīya; but its function is to present before the Self and as other than the Self something which is really not present there as a second entity. It is avidyā which presents the dualistic universe of the waking and dream states in the non-dual Brahman which was experienced in suṣupti or samādhi. And this avidyā is āgantuka, that which comes and goes. The world of creation disappears entirely in suṣupti along with avidyā. The world then remains entirely non-different from the Self and that was why it was not seen as a second entity. Is not this world then non-different from the Self even now, in this waking state? Yes, it is so. It is our idea that the world is other than the Self that constitutes our ignorance and this is bound to disappear if we fully understand the implications of the unitary experience of samādhi or suṣupti with the aid of reason, resulting in the realization or vidyā: 'All this is Brahman', 'All this is Ātman'. Both vidyā and avidyā are absent in the state of suṣupti and nirvikalpa-samādhi. The vidyā of the jñānin and the avidyā of the ajñānin

both disappear in those states where all is Brahman and Brahman alone. The knowledge of this non-duality alone removes the avidyā of the waking state and the world is seen then as nothing other than the Self. No creation or projection has really taken place. All this was Brahman; all this is Brahman; all this will continue to be Brahman. The question how the world came out of the Brahman will become meaningless when the Truth of the unborn Brahman is realized.

### 13. CAUSALITY NOT TRUE

This affords us an occasion to discuss the affirmation of potential avidyā during sleep in the *Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara (II. iii. 31). It is clear that the argument there is based on causality. 'This explanation is appropriate, because nothing can be assumed to spring up unless it be from something else; otherwise we would have to suppose that effects spring up without causes.' Now, that causality itself is an assumption from the standpoint of practical common-sense without which the activities of everyday life will be impossible, but not true when enquired into, that is to say, not philosophically true, has been shown by Gauḍapāda in the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* and accepted by Śaṅkara in the commentary to it. The assumption is only pragmatic (vyāvahārika), but not existent in truth, (pāramārthika). It is not even as true as the objects which are supposed to exist as cause and effect; for while we can see the seed and the tree with our eyes the relation between them is based on supposition or imagination. In other words, causality is a concept, not a precept, full of self-contradictions. Hence it has to be rejected as a true statement of the relation between the two. In truth, there is no relation between them. It is Brahman that appears as the seed and then as the tree; this is the Vedāntic view. There may be invariable regularity in the precedence and succession of the seed and the tree. But we can never prove it is the seed (cause) that has become the tree (effect); for either the cause has changed or not changed to become the effect. If it has not changed, it has not become the effect; it would have remained as it was. If it has changed, some new factor not found in the cause has come into existence, or some factor has disappeared, otherwise we would not call it effect. That a new word is required to

denote the effect shows that something new has come in, or something has been lost. We have, therefore, to admit that phenomena do spring up without causes. Only we should not call them effects; for if we do, we assume causes. In fact, every change, every fresh phenomenon is a challenge to the concept of causality. Therefore, ākasmika utpatti or spontaneous origination is possible. It is taking place all around us every moment. This is in accordance with our everyday experience and twentieth century science. The doctrine of causality is a pragmatic assumption which does not stand the search of reason. This is the position taken in the *Kārikā* which refutes the assumption allowed in the *Sūtra-bhāṣya*. The result is this: this world-appearance is spontaneous and does not require any cause. It is no doubt false appearance, mithyājñāna in Brahman; no one can say why it should retract in deep sleep, samādhi and pralaya (cosmic dissolution), nor why it should reappear. Its appearance and dis-appearance are inexplicable; its true nature is incomprehensible; it is anirvacanīya; that is why it is said to be *māyā*. But the knowledge 'All this is Brahman—Ātman', (samyak-jñāna) leaves behind no second entity to be explained. All phenomena are the false appearance of Brahman and no explanation is necessary. Therefore, the view of causality taken up in the *Sūtra-bhāṣya* as a concession to the commonsense view is not final; it is abandoned later on when enquiry has matured.

This question will be further discussed in connection with the prājña and turīya of the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* (*Vide Part II*).

## 14. ARE YOU REALLY BOUND?

The question how the world came out, on waking, as an object of experience after having been non-different from the Self in deep sleep, is again put in a slightly different form thus: Having been free from all bondage in *suṣṭi*, how is it that I am a bound soul again in this waking state? The reply is that the idea that I am a bound soul or I am a freed soul are superimpositions on the *Ātman* and these were absent in sleep. There is nothing except *jñāna* to prevent superimpositions of any kind and to any number, on the Reality which does not undergo any change on account of these superimpositions. They leave the *Ātman* entirely unaffected. The rope is not affected by our superimposing the ideas of snake, garland or a streak of water on it. These wrong ideas simply vanish when the right knowledge of the rope arises. The nature of the Self is not opposed to our superimpositions. Therefore, these superimpositions are not destroyed by the Self. A superimposition can be destroyed only by another superimposition which is opposed to the former. Therefore, it is the knowledge of the Self, the idea that I am free, that is opposed to the wrong idea that I am bound which will destroy bondage. These two could not, therefore, co-exist in the same mind; one drives out the other. A *baddha-jīva*, bound soul, therefore, cannot be a *jīvan-mukta*, freed soul, at the same time; but neither the *jīva* nor its sense of bondage exists in deep sleep. Our individuality with all its limiting adjuncts entirely disappears in *suṣṭi*. Nor can one have the idea, 'I am a freed soul', in that state. The freedom, therefore, that is experienced in *suṣṭi* is not *jīvanmukti* (freedom of the soul during its apparent existence in the waking), but the freedom of *videhamukti* (freedom when there is no experi-

ence of the body) or ajātamukti (freedom of the unborn or unprojected state), the Self's own nature; for jīvanmukti has meaning only when there is the appearance of jīva, that is to say in the waking state. The superimpositions, the ideas of bondage or freedom of the waking state are not opposed to the real nature of the Self which is experienced in deep sleep. The question, therefore, 'How I became bound again' is inadmissible. You are not really bound. You are eternally free. You have only to give up the wrong idea of your bondage and remember what you are in suṣupti: *tat tvam asi śvetaketo*: 'śvetaketo, thou art that which thou art in deep sleep.'

## 15. TURĪYA THE SAME AS SAMPRASĀDA

So far we have not mentioned the much-talked about turīya. If by turīya is meant the state of advaitajñāna, then, we have seen that it comes within the waking state. There is no need for a separate concept other than the state of jñāna in the waking. If, on the other hand, turīya means the Ātman other than the waking, dream and sleep states, the self that is the witness of all the three, sarvadṛk sadā, then alone can it be counted as a fourth one. This is possible if sleep also is thought of as a state. But, is sleep really a state? Before answering this question, let us apply the foregoing logic to the turīya also. If turīya-anubhava is a state other than waking, dream and sleep and the state of jñāna in the waking, then the Ātman which witnesses these four states becomes turīyātīta, a fifth one beyond the four states. There are theologies which claim that turīyātīta is the Reality and not turīya (*Vide Turīyātīta Upaniṣad* and *Śaiva-siddhānta*). If again turīyātīta is a state, we have to go in for a turīyātīta-atīta as the witness of turīyātīta and so on and so forth endlessly without ever reaching the Ultimate Reality. If we want to avoid this *regressus ad infinitum*, we should avoid committing the initial error of supposing that suṣṭi also is a state, even though adopting the language of common parlance, we ourselves have talked about it as a state. A state is temporary. It appears and disappears; it comes and goes. The jāgrat and svapna are states as they appear and disappear. What appears and disappears is the dṛśya (objective) side of our experience including the ego. The dṛk, the Witness, the Self, never disappears. It is there in the so-called state of sleep also. It is here and now in the waking and does not undergo any modification. It did not undergo any modification in sleep, and It alone existed,

One without a second: *salīla eko draṣṭā advaito bhavati*. Therefore, sleep is not a state. It is that which fills the gap between two states. We called it by the name sleep to make a contrast with the waking and dream to note their absence. But the only thing, which remains in our experience when the two states disappear, does not undergo any change whatever, and therefore, is not really a state, is Brahman Itself. 'The suṣupti is Ātman itself, Brahman Itself.'<sup>1</sup> 'It is the true, because it is not anything other than Brahman; it is the absolute Reality.'<sup>2</sup> 'The knowers of Brahman do not see or desire attainment of Self in any state other than dreamless sleep.'<sup>3</sup> 'In this state the "Being All" is the natural state of this Ātman; in this way Yājñavalkya taught Janaka that in suṣupti the nature of the Ātman which is free from and transcends all relations of saṃsāra such as nescience, desire and effort is experienced directly.'<sup>4</sup> 'Therefore, the point of deep sleep is a demonstration of mokṣa or liberation.'<sup>5</sup>

The word prājña is used for the Ātman (Self) in deep sleep when thought of as the potential state of the future waking and dream states. It is therefore supposed to be the causal state of the projected universe. Śaṅkara says

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<sup>1</sup> *ātmā eva suṣuptisthānam, brahmaiva tvekaṃ suṣuptisthānam (Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya, II. i. 6).*

<sup>2</sup> *satyaṃ hi avitatham brahma.*

(Chānd. U. Bhāṣya, VIII. iii. 4)

<sup>3</sup> *na hi suṣuptisthānād anyatra svam apītim icchanti brahmadevaḥ (Chānd. U. Bhāṣya, VI. viii. 1).*

<sup>4</sup> *tatra ca sarvātmabhāvaḥ svabhāvo asya, evam avidyā-kāmakarmādi sarvasaṃsāra-dharmasaṃbandhātītam rūpam asya sākṣāt suṣuptau gṛhyate; iti etat vijñāpitam.*

(Br. U. Bhāṣya, IV. iii. 34)

<sup>5</sup> *tasmāt samprasādasthānam mokṣadrṣṭāntabhūtam.*

(Br. U. Bhāṣya, IV. iii. 34)

that it is this very same Ātman of the deep sleep state when not thought of as a causal state which is spoken of as turīya. 'That which is the cause of the phenomenal world, designated as prājña, will be described as turīya separately when it is not viewed as the cause and when it is free from all phenomenal relationships (such as that of the body etc.) *i.e.* in its absolutely real aspect.'<sup>1</sup> This, as we have seen, is experienced in deep sleep. Therefore, we have to stop with this maximum of unlimited experience once we have found it and should not confuse our understanding by introducing unnecessary concepts.<sup>2</sup> The concept of turīya is, philosophically considered, superfluous and the concept of prājña as Īśvara is a theological supposition which is not verified in experience, as we do not see ourselves governing the universe or as knowing the past, present and future of anything whatsoever in suṣupti. Nor do we see the world merging into or coming out of the Ātman in deep sleep. Such an experience may be true of mystic states but not of suṣupti. If by prājña is meant only the pure experience, prajñaptimātra, then it does not differ from the concept of samprasāda which is unrelated to the universe and free from nescience and which alone is true to the experience of dreamless sleep. Therefore, the Ātman is not a fourth one in our experience. It is only the third, if jāgrat and svapna are counted as separate states and the Ātman as its witness. But even these states

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<sup>1</sup> *tām abījāvasthām tasyaiva prājñāsābdavācyasya turīyatvena dehādisambandharahitām pāramārthikīm pṛthag vakṣyati.*  
(*Māṇḍūkya. U. Bhāṣya, I. vi, 2*)

<sup>2</sup> *Occam's Razor:* The Principle that the unnecessary supposition that things of a peculiar kind exist, when the observed facts may be equally well explained on the supposition that no such things exist, is unwarranted. In the Middle Ages the monk Occam enunciated a famous axiom to the effect that 'Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity'.

can be reduced and brought under a common category—*viśeṣavijñāna* state. For, both these are states of particularised knowledge. So, we have only two kinds of experience: one with *viśeṣavijñāna* comprising waking, dream and multifarious forms of mystic experiences; and the other, *nirviśeṣa-anubhava*, free from any kind of particularisation of consciousness. This latter is called *suṣupti* or *samādhi* according to the undisciplined or disciplined states of a non-experienced mind supposed to be there. Of these, the *viśeṣavijñāna* or the state of particularised knowledge is only an apparent modification of the *nirviśeṣa-anubhava* of the deep sleep state. For the *viśeṣas*, particulars, disappear in *suṣupti* leaving behind only the *nirviśeṣa-brahman*, the One without a second. The state of *brahma-jñāna*, therefore, falls within the *viśeṣavijñāna* state where there are the ideas such as, 'All this is Brahman', 'All this is Ātman', 'I am Brahman', 'There is no duality here', etc. If *turīya* is the position attained by the *jñānin* free from non-perception (*agrahaṇa*) and wrong perception (*anyathāgrahaṇa*) of the Reality, then it falls within the waking state. If the *turīya* is the witness of that state, that witness is no other than the witness in deep sleep. 'That is the last point, that is the Supreme.'<sup>1</sup> 'There is no seer other than him.'<sup>2</sup> 'He knows all and is the Eternal Knower.'<sup>3</sup>

The message of the Vedānta may be summed up thus:

Arise, awake, and know the serene self of dreamless sleep.<sup>4</sup> Thou art That.<sup>5</sup> The philosophy of deep sleep is the key to the realization of Brahman.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatih.*

<sup>2</sup> *nānyo 'to 'sti draṣṭā.*

<sup>3</sup> *tat sarvadr̥k sadā.*

<sup>4</sup> *uttiṣṭhata, jāgrata, samprasādam nibodhata.*

<sup>5</sup> *tat tvam asi.*

<sup>6</sup> *samprasādayai 'va brahmavidyā.*

## 16. SĀDHANAS OR DISCIPLINES

What are the disciplines or sādhanas for the realization of Brahman?

We have dealt with the main and immediate sādhana viz. vicāra or Reason. By reason, it has already been pointed out, we do not mean mere logic, but reasoning on experience or upapatti so as to be in harmony with it. This is nothing but scientific method. The student of jñānayoga, therefore, will do well to be disciplined in the scientific method of reasoning on observed data. While the śruti may impart the necessary faith and authority so as to lead him to the quest for Truth, it is his own experience that will finally count and be the final authority in the matter of realization. He must at every turn put the question to himself: How do I know? And if he cannot answer the question, he must know that what he has believed to be true is only second-hand knowledge, mere hearsay, and not his own realization. If I know, I also know how I know; and if I do not know how I know, mine is only mere belief and not realization. Logic being the discipline of correct thinking, of drawing conclusions from given data, forms part of rationalistic discipline; but it must always be subordinate to or based upon observed and verified data (*anubhavāṅgatvena tarkaḥ*).

Concentration and a peaceful state of mind are necessary for the philosopher. The instrument of thinking must be made sharp and fine enough to deal with abstract ideas and subtle problems. If the intellect is dull, it cannot reflect the truth and distinguish it from falsehood and fallacy. Hence a sāt̄tvic and bright mind is the fittest instrument for the realization of Brahman.

Although it is not necessary that one must have attained moral perfection before one can take to philo-

sophical enquiry, there is no gainsaying the fact that an immoral man can never realize the truth.

‘This Ātman cannot be realized by one who has not refrained from wickedness or from sense-pleasures, nor can he be attained in self-intuition by one whose mind is not at peace nor concentrated.’<sup>1</sup>

The seeker after truth must ever be truthful in thought, word and deed and should not practise deception either on himself or on others. Intellectual honesty and integrity are as much required as integrity of conduct and character. The man who is addicted to sense gratifications, who is given to strong attachments and aversions, hatred and love, who is dishonest or treacherous, jealous, spiteful and selfish and greedy for lucre etc., will not have the necessary disposition and determination for the search after truth. One whose mind is always agitated and full of ambitions and plans and who is tossed about by lust, anger, grief or excessive joy cannot have the equanimity of temper for philosophical search. Although the motive power of the jñānin is the desire to know the truth, as in the man of pure science, but as the field of enquiry does not exclude his own self unlike in the natural sciences, the knowledge itself brings about changes in one’s outlook on life and deeply influences one’s character and modifies it in the light of the truth realized. It transforms the sinner into the saint, although it may not bring about changes in one’s vocation or occupation. The more one comes to know the truth about oneself, the less does he find it necessary to lead an uncontrolled and immoral life. In proportion to the bliss he discovers and enjoys as natural to the Self, the less does he find pleasure in the objects of the external

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<sup>1</sup> *nā ’virato duṣcaritāt nā ’śānto nā ’samāhitah nā ’śānta-manaso vā ’pi prajñānenai ’nam āpnuyāt (Kāṭha U., II. 24).*

world. Control of the mind and of the senses becomes natural to him; detachment or vairāgya in his case is nothing but the reflection in conduct and will of the natural detachment—*nissāṅgatva* of the Ātman. Hatred and jealousy will give place to universal love and regard for all beings, as he finds more and more that 'the Self is all This'. Selfishness and greed give way to charity, generosity and sacrifice, meanness to nobility and dignity, and vanity and pride to humility and respect and regard for others. Monasticism may not be a necessary step in all cases, but it cannot be disputed that monasticism offers the most congenial atmosphere and conditions for a strenuous, whole-hearted and single-minded struggle for realization free from the distractions and temptations of householders' life. Discrimination, detachment and continence are anyway the necessary conditions of realization. The perfected sage may not be punctilious about external observances, but the *sādhaka* cannot afford to relax and lose grip of his senses and mind; he has to be ever alert and watchful. To control the mind and senses, the *jñāna-yogin* simply resorts to the remembrance of the truth he has discovered about himself. The perfection of the Self, the mere remembrance of it, acts as a resistant to temptations. To be untrue to oneself, to violate one's nature, to suppress one's conscience is very painful on account of its contradiction to the true nature of the Self; and this produces a natural check upon conduct. The *jñāna-yogin* does not depend upon mere *abhyāsa* or practice for self-control. He knows that reliance on practice of self-control is like sitting on a spring to keep it down. As soon as the pressure on the spring is relaxed the spring jumps up. In the same way the mind controlled by practice alone might give way at any moment to temptations, because it has been held down by mere will-power. That is the

method of the rājayogin. The jñānin on the other hand relies on his knowledge of the truth: 'All this is the Self.' He does not find a second other than the Self. Desires die, therefore, a natural death. So does fear, for fear is due to something or someone other than the Self—*dvitīyād vai bhayaṁ bhavati*. We may also say that desire arises because of something other than the Self—*dvitīyād vai kāmo bhavati*. Desires form the spring for all kinds of selfish, greedy, dishonest, treacherous, spiteful, lascivious and all other kinds of immoral conduct on the part of man. When the roots of wrong conduct are destroyed, wholesome conduct and integrity of character follow as a natural consequence. While Vedic religions and sacrificial cult might have encouraged other-worldliness, the Vedānta has discouraged the desire for heavens and has preached instead unworldliness.

From a practical stand-point, the Vedānta has offered mukti as the motive power for knowledge. In the case of those whose quest is not pure knowledge for its own sake, there must be another motive; and there can be no other greater motive than freedom from misery and bondage. Though the Ātman is eternally free, jīvanmukti is the result of knowing it thus. Mokṣa is the result of jñāna, is its by-product, and the persistent pursuit of knowledge is maintained by some for the sake of the ultimate practical benefit it confers on them. Mumukṣutva, though not a sādhana to be practised, is thus a precedent condition for unremitting struggle. The practical benefit conferred by jñāna is jīvanmukti—freedom while living. The mind and body of the jñānin is as much subject to the laws of nature as those of the ajñānin. Freedom, therefore, in this context means only the freedom of the spirit, the Self, from the laws of nature by knowing itself to be eternally different from nature. No man can say of

another, of a certainty, whether he is a jīvanmukta or not; only one can know for oneself whether the thorn is pricking him or not. Bondage or freedom can be felt only by oneself as the Truth is realized by oneself. Freedom from physical suffering is not the *sine-qua-non* of jñāna. This can be had by haṭha-yoga and other exercises, good food, climate, etc. Good health may be a useful asset for the jñānin as for the worldly man, but such a mean result cannot be his ultimate aim. His freedom is through knowledge, so that it produces no change in the physical constitution. The jñānin does not identify himself with it and therein lies freedom. But in his own judgement the suffering of a jñānin is only an apparent phenomenon just as his enjoyment. To him both are unreal. Or, seen from another angle, everything is Brahman, real or unreal, suffering as well as enjoyment, death as well as life. Whether one wishes or not, jñāna brings about mokṣa by the removal of avidyā and the manifestation of the freedom of the Self. As bondage is due to wrong knowledge, right knowledge alone is enough to enable us to realize the freedom of the Self which is its nature. We thus come to know that the Self was never in bondage, but was ever free and will be ever free.

## 17. IS THERE SĀDHANA AFTER BRAHMAJÑĀNA?

Is there any sādhanā after the attainment of jñāna? We have already shown that the idea of the mystics or dhyāna-yogins that after the attainment of self-knowledge through reasoning, one should try by dhyāna, samādhi or intuition to identify oneself with Brahman, is due to the ignorance of the traditional technique taught by Vedānta. For, by the knowledge 'I am Brahman' one becomes Brahman— *brahmavid brahmai 'va bhavati*. Therefore, there is no need for further effort to attain what has been attained. It is not that he wills himself to be Brahman; for, if he is not already Brahman, how can he become what he is not? The real nature of a thing never undergoes change. If anything about a thing changes, that changing factor cannot be its real nature. If my Brahmanhood is to be brought about, then that Brahmanhood could not have been my real nature. Whatever is affected by karma or volition will wear out in course of time when the force of karma wears out. Liberation or Brahmanhood is not something which can be wrought by dhyāna or even by jñāna. Samyakjñāna or ripe knowledge is vastutantra, that is to say, controlled by or determined by the nature of the thing itself. The real nature of a thing is not something which can be manipulated by a person's will (puruṣatantra) nor by knowledge (buddhitānta), The function of reason in the field of brahma-vidyā is simply the removal of mithyājñāna or wrong knowledge, the Self or Brahman, which is of the very nature of knowledge or awareness, remaining as it is. Therefore, the only thing the jñānin has to do, if at all he is to do anything by way of sādhanā, is just to remember what he has already realized through avasthātraya-vicāra. This remembrance of the truth of one's own nature and of

the nature of the universe is automatic in those who have already undergone the preparatory disciplines, and have controlled the senses and the passions and have tranquillised the mind. But in the case of those who have not undergone the sādhanas, their remembrance is obstructed by the habits of thinking, feeling and willing formed previous to enlightenment. In such cases there might be a little conflict between the truth realized and the accumulated habits or vāsanās. Our old ways of thinking, feeling and willing have to be changed in order to fit in with the new realization. Our conduct and character must harmonise with our realization. This process of readjustment produces a struggle between the new thought-flow of Self-realization and the older tendencies. By continuing the sādhanas of śama and dama, renunciation of desires etc. the jñānin simply tries to remove the obstructions to the manifestation of the effects of the knowledge through his conduct and character, without allowing himself to be overpowered by the old vāsanās. Everytime an opposite idea from the store-house of memory invades his consciousness, he has only to remember the truth that he has realized. This remembrance will drive away the wrong ideas. Gradually his psycho-physical being will adjust itself to be in harmony with his realization. He has only to surrender himself to the realized truth and allow it to soak into his being; that is all what he has to do. When the readjustment is complete, the jñānin is said to be a jīvanmukta or one liberated in life.

## 18. IS KNOWLEDGE OPPOSED TO WORK?

The idea that the māyāvāda of Vedānta has been at the root of India's degradation, listlessness, inactivity, conservatism, unprogressiveness, poverty and many other evils for the last few centuries, is still a current criticism among many political leaders and the ignorant public. That this kind of criticism is baseless will be evident from the very fact that the great Vedānta-ācāryas like Bhagavān Kṛṣṇa, Śaṅkara and Vivekānanda and the Buddha too, who have been some of the towering personalities and heroes of action as well as of thought and who made India's history, have also been preachers of māyāvāda. Their māyāvāda made them the most selfless beings on earth, because to them their own bodies and comforts, wealth and relations and possessions were only shadows of a dream-world which they could easily renounce, and they could devote themselves to the amelioration of the society around them, out of deep compassion, seeing only their own Self in all embodied beings. The greatest yogin, according to the *Gītā* is he who feels the happiness and unhappiness of others as his own, just as he feels them in himself, because of his realization of the same Self in all creatures. The result was: Out of them issued an all-embracing love for all suffering and ignorant humanity and even for sub-human species, bearing its fruit in intense activity and creative enthusiasm for centuries after they passed away. Vedānta may not consider material progress as all in all, as the *summum bonum* of life. But it does not preach renunciation of worldly interest, for those who are not adhikārins, for those who are not duly qualified by vairāgya or dispassion for the world; for them are preserved by the śāstras the other three puruṣārthas or ends of life—dharma, artha and kāma—ethical idealism,

wealth and power and enjoyment of pleasures. As the *Gītā* says, no confusion of thought is to be produced in the minds of the ignorant, attached to karma. The jñānin, instead, devotes himself to intense activity to set an example to the ignorant, all the while holding the world to be an illusion, his own personality and activity included. If the world is māyā, so is his psychological being and all its functionings; the jñānin's ego as well as the world he serves are equally illusory in his understanding. Māyāvāda is not thereby contradicted, disproved or discredited,

There is another way in which the jñānin may look upon all his activities: here the illusory aspect of the universe is replaced by the aspect of the unity of all existence, the unity of the Absolute. Everything in this vision of the jñānin is Brahman—the Real as well as the unreal.<sup>1</sup> The *Gītā* clearly refers to this in the passage, 'The sacrificial act is Brahman, the offering is Brahman, the fire is Brahman, the sacrificer is Brahman, the goal is Brahman and the sacrificer is established in brahma-karma-samādhi', where all karma with its means and ends and agents are looked upon as the same Brahman. No karma of his, therefore, contradicts his realization of the unity of the Self.

There is still another way in which the jñānin, while doing all karma, remains the mere on-looker of his activities and of the whole world. This is from the standpoint of the discrimination between the seer and the seen—*dṛgdr̥śyaviveka*. Here the dualism of the Self and the non-self, the difference between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* is retained, *prakṛti* remaining as real as the *puruṣa*. This is the standpoint of Sāṅkhya. In this vision, the agent with his ego, intellect, mind, sense-organs and body, with all their

<sup>1</sup> *tat satyaṁ cā 'nṛtaṁ cā 'bhavat (Taittirīya U., II. 6).*

activities form part of Nature, of which the Self is the inactive witness and non-doer and non-enjoyer. It is the cosmos that goes on whirling like a huge machine of which the psychological being of the jñānin is a part, a spoke in the wheel, the witnessing Self merely revealing the modifications, evolutions and changes in the cosmos. The Self has no part in the drama. It enjoys perfect peace and calm in the midst of intense activity; the idea that 'I am the doer and enjoyer' is not entertained. Of them, it is said in the *Gītā*: 'All karma is being done by prakṛti. He who sees thus and looks upon himself as the non-doer sees the truth.'<sup>1</sup> Or, there is another way of looking at the same truth by a devotee when he sees himself as a mere instrument in the hands of the Lord of the cosmos. The *Gītā* refers to this in the verse: 'The Lord is seated in the hearts of all beings moving them all to activity like puppets mounted on machines by the power of his māyā.'<sup>2</sup> All his activities are, therefore, a part of the līlā or sport of the Lord.

The inactivity that is generally associated with the mystic outlook is not the outcome of jñāna or enlightenment, but is the prelude to such enlightenment. There is a period of retirement and seclusion in which alone single-minded search for the highest truth can be undertaken, undisturbed by distractions and unhampered by responsibilities and worldly duties. This is the period of monasticism (*vividiṣā-saṁnyāsa*) for the sake of getting instruction in the scriptures (śravaṇa), discrimination (*manana*) and contemplation (*nididhyāsana*). No one

<sup>1</sup> *prakṛtyai 'va ca karmāṇi kriyamāṇāni sarvaśaḥ  
yaḥ paśyati tathātmānam akartāram sa paśyati.*

<sup>2</sup> *īśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānām hṛddeśe 'rjuna tiṣṭhati  
bhrāmāyan sarvabhūtāni yantrārūḍhāni māyayā.*

criticises an astronomer, a physicist or a chemist if he retires into his observatory or laboratory for research work; similarly the seeker after the highest truth has also a worthy place of his own which has been recognised by all cultured societies. The period of retirement may be short or long; that depends upon the qualifications of the seeker. But when he has become a vidvāṅ, a sthitaprajña, one established in the highest truth, retirement is no more prescribed for him. In whatever way he remains, he is ever in sahaja-samādhi or natural superconsciousness.

It is also to be understood that it is dhyāna rather than jñāna which makes a man externally inactive, for *dhyāna* and karma are the inward and outward expressions of the same faculty of the mind, namely, *willing* and *which*, therefore, cannot co-exist. The mind cannot will in two directions at the same time. The modifications of the mind in the continuous thought of the Ātman cannot co-exist with the modifications required for activities such as writing, speaking, digging, walking etc. One will put a stop to the other. That is why dhyāna is opposed to karma. But the case is different with jñāna, as the mind here is not necessarily absorbed in the thought of the ātman; it is now released from the absorption of dhyāna. Dhyāna leads to samādhi, making the yogin unconscious of even his body and the outer world. Jñāna, on the other hand, does not involve the absorption of the mind. The yogin feels peace, freedom and bliss when his mind is settled in the Self to the exclusion of all other thoughts; but when the mind comes away from it, he feels restless, identifies himself with his body, mind and senses, and feels the misery of finite consciousness born of such re-identification with his upādhis or limiting adjuncts. He feels he has fallen away from his true nature in which he remained in samādhi; and his longing is to go back into the solitude

and absorption of samādhi, so that, external activities, responsibilities and duties are heavy weights which pull his mind away from the throne of the Self in which it wants always to be seated. Hence the *Gītā* says: 'Cessation from external activities is the necessary condition for remaining established in yoga'<sup>1</sup>. The jñānin too may be found on occasions to remain unconscious of his body and the external world; but then it is not the result of jñāna or illumination, it is the result of absorption. But such absorption is not a necessary condition or concomitant of jñāna and is independent of jñāna. Jñāna, on the other hand, is not opposed to karma. When a morsel of food is eaten by me, the knowledge that it is rice does not stand in the way of my raising it to my mouth and of chewing and swallowing it, but if in the midst of raising it, I get too much absorbed in some thought or other, I may let the morsel drop and my hand may remain fixed up half way to the mouth. In the same way, when the mind of the jñānin is not absorbed in dhyāna, which is optional to him, he may be working in the world without his knowledge of Brahman getting impaired in the least. He has realized that he is the same saccidānanda under all conditions and this knowledge once realized is never sublated or destroyed, such illumination being the very nature of the Self: 'sakṛdvibhāta' as the *śruti* says. The jñānin's mind may, therefore, get absorbed in any so-called worldly activity and not think of the ātman unless any particular necessity arises, and thus when he is called upon to think of the Self, the knowledge of it is ever there in the mind which has been illumined once for all. In the same way, while dealing with the external things and persons unless he is called

<sup>1</sup> *yogārūḍhasya tasyai 'va śamaḥ kāraṇam ucyate.*

upon by any circumstance to get absorbed in the contemplation of their ultimate Brahman nature, his external activities may continue undisturbed. His mind can fully merge itself in such activities, as there is nothing else in the world to be cared for than the immediate work in hand. He has no personal problem to solve; nothing remains unattained by him, he has no anxieties, worries, hopes, expectations or disappointments to distract him. Therefore, he works in perfect peace, freedom and joy and with perfect concentration and abandon.



## PART TWO

## ARGUMENT

Now it is the general Vedānta doctrine that at the time of deep sleep the soul becomes one with the highest Brahman, and that from the highest Brahman the whole world proceeds, inclusive of prāṇa and so on. When scripture, therefore, represents as the object of knowledge that in which there takes place the deep sleep of the soul characterised by absence of empirical consciousness and utter tranquillity, that is, a state devoid of all those specific cognitions which are produced by the limiting adjuncts of the soul, and from which the soul returns when the sleep is broken, we understand that the highest Self is meant (*Bṛ. Sū. Bhāṣya, I. iv 18*).

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*susuptikāle ca pareṇa brahmaṇā jīva ekatām gacchati, parasmāt ca brahmaṇaḥ prāṇādikaṃ jagaj-jāyata iti vedānta-  
maryādā. tasmād yatrā 'sya jīvasya niḥsambodhatāsvacchatā-  
rūpaḥ svāpa upādhijanitaviśeṣavijñānarahitaṃ svarūpaṃ, yatas  
tadbhramśarūpam āgamaṇam, so' tra paramātmā veditavyatayā  
śrāvita iti gamyate.*

In order that the student of the foregoing talks may feel assured that the position taken up herein though a bit out of the beaten track is the orthodox position as propounded by the Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara's commentaries thereon, the following references are appended with short observations thereon.

## 1. CHĀNDOGYOPANIṢAD

SADVIDYĀ

VI. viii. 1. In this section is given the famous mahāvākya, '*tat tvam asi*'. The context proves that the meaning of it is, 'Thou art that which thou art in deep sleep'. The text says that the word 'sleeps' (*svapiti*) implies the attainment of pure existence; and therein one attains one's own Self.<sup>1</sup> In discussing the meaning of *svapnāntam* and determining it as dreamless sleep, Śaṅkara says that in no other state than deep sleep do the knowers of Brahman find the attainment of one's own Self.<sup>2</sup> Because therein the self gives up its reflector mind and *jīvatva* (embodiedness) and attains its own form as the Supreme Deity.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *yatrai 'tat puruṣaḥ svapiti nāma satū somya tadā sampanno bhavati svam apīto bhavati tasmād enam svapiti 'ty ācakṣate, svam hi apīto bhavati.*

<sup>2</sup> *na hy anyatra suṣuptāt svam apītim jīvasya icchanti brahmavidah (Chā. U. Bhāṣya, VI. viii. 1).*

<sup>3</sup> *tatra . . . mana-ādy uparame caitanyapratibimbarūpeṇa jīvenā 'tmanā manasi praviṣṭā nāmarūpavyākaraṇāya parā devatā sā svam evā 'tmānam pratipadye jīvarūpatām manā ākhyām hitvā (Ibid).*

The state is compared to the state in which one's reflection has been withdrawn to one's own self when the mirror is removed. That the reference is not to the dream-state is insisted upon, because therein mergence in one's own self does not take place on account of avidyā (nescience), kāma (desire) and karma (activity) which are the causes of saṁsāra (sojourn in this world). Further, Śaṅkara strengthens the position by a quotation from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* referring to deep sleep which is said to be free from merit and demerit and free from sorrows and desires, and which is said to be supreme bliss. Again, Śaṅkara says that Uddālaka tells his son that in deep sleep itself he would show his divinity which is free from individuality, jīvatva.<sup>1</sup>

In deep sleep one is said to have become one with Absolute Existence.<sup>2</sup>

A third time in this context Śaṅkara says that jīvatva (embodiedness) is given up in deep sleep and the self is said to attain the Absolute Reality.<sup>3</sup>

The expression *yat paramārthasatyam* should be particularly noted, meaning thereby that it is not a mere semblance of the Absolute Reality, but the Reality itself.

In his commentary on VI.viii.3, Śaṅkara says: 'Having thus shown the real nature of the jīva (embodied soul) and the substratum of the universe through the well-known

<sup>1</sup> *suṣuptau eva svaṁ devatūrūpaṁ jīvatvavinirmuktaṁ darśayiṣyāmī 'ty āha (Chā. U. Bhāṣya, VI. viii. 1).*

<sup>2</sup> *satā sampanno bhavati = ekībhūto bhavati.*

<sup>3</sup> *manasi praviṣṭaṁ mana-ūdi-saṁsarga-kṛtaṁ jīvarūpaṁ parityajya svaṁ sadrūpaṁ yat paramārthasatyam apīto apigato bhavati (Ibid).*

experience of sleep, he next traced the root of the universe through the series of causes and effects etc.<sup>1</sup>

Having shown that we attain to pure existence in deep sleep, mantra four and five say that the whole universe has its origin and stay in that Absolute Existence.<sup>2</sup> And after showing that just as in deep sleep, in death also we attain to that Supreme Deity, *parādevatā*, the Upaniṣad teaches that this subtle essence which is the Self of all this, is the Reality and that is the Self, your Self, *tat tvam asi, śvetaketo*.<sup>3</sup>

VI-9 and 10 through the examples of the honey and the rivers, teach that there is neither *vidyā* nor *avidyā* in deep sleep. There the individual does not know himself as a separate entity as in the waking state. It is the consciousness of individuality that constitutes *avidyā*, nescience. Nor is one conscious of one's identity with Brahman in that state. Even the *jñānin* in deep sleep is not aware that he is Brahman. On account of this want of *vidyā* in deep sleep, the union with Brahman is of no consequence in the waking state. That is why a lion or a tiger or a bird wakes up from deep sleep with the same old lion-consciousness, or tiger-consciousness or bird-consciousness with which it went into sleep. Śaṅkara in the commentary on VI. x. 1 says that even though every day the *jīvas* attain to the causal state in deep sleep, as in death and in cosmic dissolution (*pralaya*) they are not destroyed,

<sup>1</sup> *evam svapiti-nāmaprasiddhidvāreṇa yaj jīvasya satya-svarūpaṃ jagato mūlaṃ tat putrasya darśayitvā āha annādikāryakāraṇaparamparayā 'pi jagato mūlaṃ sad didarśayiṣuḥ.*

<sup>2</sup> *sanmūlāḥ someye 'māḥ sarvāḥ prajāḥ sadāyatanāḥ sat-pratiṣṭhāḥ.*

<sup>3</sup> *sa ya eṣo aṇimai 'tadātmyam idaṃ sarvaṃ tat satyaṃ sa ātmā tat tvam asi śvetaketo (Chānd. U., VI. viii. 7).*

unlike waves and bubbles on their attaining their causal state, viz., water.<sup>1</sup> It is, therefore, clear that that which was experienced in deep sleep was not anything other than the real nature of the jīva and the substratum of the universe.

This point is brought out by Śaṅkara in the *Updeśasāhasrī* also, Vide Part I, 93—Disciple: ‘But, Sir, I was never conscious of consciousness or anything else in deep sleep. Teacher: You were then conscious in deep sleep, because you deny the existence of objects of knowledge (in that state), but not that of knowledge. I have told that what is your consciousness is nothing but absolute knowledge. The consciousness owing to whose presence you deny (the existence of things in deep sleep) by saying “I was conscious of nothing” is the knowledge, the consciousness which is your Self.’<sup>2</sup> This witness does not require any proof, for, as it never ceases to exist, its eternal existence is self-evident, and does not depend on any evidence; for only an object of knowledge different from the self-evident Knower depends on an evidence in order to be known.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *dr̥ṣṭam loke jale vīcītarāṅgaphenabudbudādaya utthitāḥ punas tadbhāvaṁ gatā vīnaśtū iti. jīvās tu tatkāraṇabhāvaṁ pratyahaṁ gacchanto 'pi suṣupte maraṇapralayayoś 'ca na vīnaśyanti.*

<sup>2</sup> *śiṣyaḥ: na hi kadācid bhagavan, suṣupte mayā caitanyam anyad vā kiñcid dr̥ṣṭam.*

*guruḥ: paśyan tarhi suṣupte tvam. yasmād dr̥ṣṭam eva pratiśedhasi, na dr̥ṣṭim. yā tava dr̥ṣṭiḥ tat caitanyam iti mayo 'ktam. yayā tvaṁ vidyamānayū na kiñcid dr̥ṣṭam iti pratiśedhasi sū dr̥ṣṭiḥ tvaccaitanyam. tarhi sarvatra avyabhicārāt kūtasthanityatvaṁ siddhaṁ svata eva, na pramāṇāpekṣam. svataḥsiddhasya hi pramātuḥ anyasya prameyasya paricchittim prati pramāṇāpekṣā (Updeśasāhasrī).*

## BHŪMAVIDYĀ

VII. xxii. 1, xxiii. 1 and xxiv. 1: Bhūman, the Infinite, is defined in xxiv. 1 as that in which or where one does not see another, does not know another.<sup>1</sup>

That this bhūman is Brahman has been established by Śaṅkara in the *sūtrabhāṣya*, I. iii. 9.<sup>2</sup> That this bhūman is the serene Self of deep sleep is asserted by Śaṅkara in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* commentary on IV. iii. 33: 'Thus that in which the other joys, increasing step by step in multiples of hundred merge and which is experienced by one versed in the Vedas, is indeed the supreme bliss called samprasāda, for in it one sees nothing else and so on—and hence is the bhūman, the Infinite and hence immortal; the other joys are the opposite of that.'<sup>3</sup>

*Bra. Sū. Bhūmādhikaraṇa: Bra. Sū. Bhāṣya I. iii. 8* amply proves that bhūman and samprasāda in the Upaniṣads mean the paramātman. 'It is the paramātman that is to be known by bhūman, not prāṇa, because it has reference to samprasāda. Samprasāda is the Self of dreamless sleep, because in this state is attained the greatest serenity'.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *yatra nā 'nyat paśyati nā 'nyac chṛṇoti nā 'nyad vijānāti sa bhūmā.*

<sup>2</sup> *api ca ye bhūmni śrūyante dharmās te paramātmany upapadyante. 'yatra nā 'nyat paśyati nā 'nyac chṛṇoti nā 'nyad vijānāti sa bhūmā' iti darśanādivyavahārābhāvaṃ bhūmani avagamayati. paramātmani cā'yaṃ darśanādivyavahārābhāvo'vagataḥ.*

<sup>3</sup> *evam śataguṇottarottara-vṛddhy upetā ānandāḥ yatrai 'katām yānti, yaś ca śrotriyapratyakṣo 'thai 'ṣa eva samprasādalakṣaṇaḥ parama ānandaḥ. tatra hi nā 'nyat paśyati nā 'nyac chṛṇoti ato bhūmā. bhūmatvād amṛtaḥ. itare tad viparītāḥ atra ca śrotriyatvā 'vṛjīnatve tulye.*

<sup>4</sup> *paramātmai 've 'ha bhūmā bhavitum arhati, na prāṇaḥ—kasmāt? samprasādād adhyupadeśāt-samprasāda iti suṣuptam sthānam ucyate; samyak prasīdati asmin iti nirvacanāt.*

Commentary to *Sūtra* I.iii.9 particularly sums up the argument thus: 'Then again the properties of bhūman are appropriate in the paramātman. The absence of all activities such as seeing etc., is shown in the words, "Where no other thing is seen, is heard, no other thing is known, that is bhūman". In the paramātman also the absence of all activities such as seeing etc., is seen.' In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, IV.v.15, there is the passage, 'when everything has become the Self, who can see whom?' Then again, whatever absence of activities such as seeing etc., has been thus mentioned, that also has been said with a view to show the unattached nature of ātman and not to explain the nature of prāṇa, because the section deals with paramātman. Also the reference to the happiness of that state is made with a view to exhibit the blissful nature of the ātman. Hence it is said: 'This is its highest bliss, and other beings live only on an atom of this bliss' (Bṛ. U., IV. iii. 32). In the words, 'that which is bhūman is bliss', 'there is no happiness in that which is finite, the Infinite alone is happiness', by denying all kinds of happiness mixed with unhappiness, the Brahman alone which is of the nature of happiness itself. *viz.*, the bhūman is shown. The statement, 'that which is bhūman is immortal', also leads to the supreme cause, *viz.*, the paramātman because all modifications are dependent on something which is immortal. Śruti also says: 'All that is other than this is mortal'. In the same way the properties mentioned by śruti such as, 'being real', 'being established in its own glory', 'all-pervasiveness', 'being the self of all' are appropriate only with regard to the paramātman and not to anything else. Therefore, it is proved that bhūman is paramātman.'

## DAHARAVIDYĀ

Chap. VIII. iii. 2<sup>1</sup> says that every day all beings go to brahmaloka, but on account of our ignorance of it we are drawn away from it just as one who does not know the golden treasure hidden underground does not possess it even though he may pass over it up and down every day. Śaṅkara in the commentary adds 'during sleep' to 'every day' and says brahmaloka means Brahman itself.<sup>2</sup>

In the commentary on the next mantra Śaṅkara explains the significance of the text *evamvid svargalokam etc.*, one who knows thus attains to svargaloka. Even though all beings attain to Brahman during sleep, the one who knows this fact even during the waking state can alone be said to have attained to It.<sup>3</sup>

Mantra 4 says that this serene self of deep sleep (samprasāda) having transcended this body attains to the

<sup>1</sup> *atha ye cā'sye'ha jīvā ye ca pretā yac cā 'nyad icchan na labhate sarvaṁ tad atra gatvā vindate 'tra hy asyai 'te satyāḥ kāmā anṛtūpidhānās tad yathā 'pi hiraṇyānīthim nihitam akṣetrajñā uparyupari saṁcaranto na vindeyur evam eva imāḥ sarvāḥ prajā aharahar gacchantya etaṁ brahmalokaṁ na vindati anṛtena hi pratyūdhāḥ.*

<sup>2</sup> *evam eve 'mā avidyāvatyah sarvā imāḥ prajā yathoktam hrdayākāśākhyam brahmalokaṁ brahmai 'va loko brahmalokas tam aharahaḥ pratyahaṁ gacchantyo 'pi suṣuptakāle na vindanti, na labhante, eṣo 'ham brahmalokabhāvam āpanno 'smy adye 'ti. anṛtena hi yathoktena hi yasmāt pratyūdhā hṛtāḥ svarūpād avidyūdidōṣair bahir apakṛṣṭā ity arthaḥ.*

<sup>3</sup> *yathā jānan ajānāms ca sarvo jantuh sadbrahmaiva tathā 'pi tat tvam asī 'ti pratibodhito vidvān sadeva nā 'nyo 'smī 'ti jānan sadeva bhavati. evam eva vidvān avidvāms ca suṣupte yady api sat sampadyate tathā api evamvideva svargaṁ lokam eṭi 'ty ucyate.*

supreme Effulgence, and remains in his own nature. This is the Ātman which is immortal and fearless. This is Brahman and the name of this Brahman is truth.<sup>1</sup> In the commentary to this, Śāṅkara explains the meaning of the word samprasāda as the self free from the impurities and worries of the waking and dream-states, which is attained in deep sleep when all beings attain to Pure Existence.<sup>2</sup>

The paramjyoti to which samprasāda attains in deep sleep is said to be the Pure Consciousness which is the nature of the supreme Self.<sup>3</sup> This is said to be the True because it is not anything other than Brahman, adds Śāṅkara, *satyaṁ hi avitathāṁ brahma*.

The idea that it is only a semblance of Brahman that is experienced in deep sleep and not Brahman itself is thereby purposely disallowed by Śāṅkara as well as the Upaniṣads.

VIII. vi. 3 teaches that when asleep, the Ātman, having become completely serene, does not see any dream. In that state no sin touches it, because in that state it has become one with its own effulgence.<sup>4</sup> In the commentary

<sup>1</sup> *atha ya eṣa samprasādo smāc charīrāt samutthāya paramjyotir upasampadya svena rūpeṇā bhiniṣpadyata eṣa ātme 'ti ho 'vācai 'tad amṛtam abhayam etad brahme 'ti tasya ha vā etasya brahmaṇo nāma satyam iti.*

<sup>2</sup> *suṣuptakāle svenā 'tmanā satū sampannaḥ san samjyak prasīdati 'ti jāgratsvapnayor viṣayendriyasaṁyogajātam kāluṣyam jahāti 'ti samprasādaśabdo yady api sarvajantūnām sādharmaṇas tathā 'pye 'vamvit svargaṁ lokam etī 'ti.*

<sup>3</sup> *param paramātmalakṣaṇam vijñaptisvabhāvam jyotir upasampadya svāsthyam upagamye 'ty etat.*

<sup>4</sup> *tad yatrai 'tat suptaḥ samastāḥ samprasannaḥ svapnam na vijānāty āsu tadā nādiṣu sṛpto bhavati tam na kaścana pāpmā sprṣati tejasā hi tadū sampanno bhavati.*

the reason for not being touched by sin is said to be that the Ātman remains in its own nature.<sup>1</sup> Why should not one who has attained to his own nature be affected by sin? Because of unity with all Existence and there is no second thing which can affect it; this is the explanation given in the commentary.<sup>2</sup> It is in the waking and dream that the self falls away from its own nature and becomes aware of external object; because the germ of nescience, desire and activity has not been burnt to ashes by brahmavidyā. This we have shown in section 6.<sup>3</sup>

### SAMPRASĀDAVIDYĀ

Chap. VIII. xi. 1. In this section Prajāpati imparts his final teaching to Indra in the following words: 'Here where the soul goes into deep sleep, completely serene all round, and where no dream is seen, that is the Ātman, that is the immortal, that is the fearless, that is Brahman'.<sup>4</sup>

It is interesting to note that Indra, as is the case with all who are told for the first time that in suṣupti one attains to the absolute Reality, lodges his protest in the following words: 'Revered Sir, I did not know myself as "I am This" in that state, as I do now. Nor did I know

<sup>1</sup> *tam satā sampannam na kaścana na kiñcid api dharmā-dharmarūpaḥ pāpmā sprśati 'ti svarūpāvasthitatvāt tadā ātmanaḥ.*

<sup>2</sup> *aviśayatvāt. anyo hi anyasya viśayo bhavati, no tu anyatvam kenacit kutaścid api satsampannasya.*

<sup>3</sup> *svarūpa-pracyavanam tū ātmano jāgratsvapnāvasthām prati gamanam bāhyaviśayapratibodho avidyākāmakarmabījasya brahmavidyāhutāsādāhanimittam ityavocāma ṣaṣṭha eva.*

<sup>4</sup> *tad yatrai 'tat suptaḥ samastah samprāsannaḥ svapnam na vijānāty eṣa ātme 'ti ho 'vācai 'tad amṛtam abhayam etad brahme 'ti.*

these beings; therein everything seemed to have been destroyed; I do not see any good in knowing about this.’<sup>1</sup> But Prajāpati replied: ‘It is so; I am going to explain to you this very being.’ *evam tveva bhūyo ’nuvyākhyāsyāmi*. In the commentary on VIII. xii. 1, says Śāṅkara: ‘Those who like Indra believe the absolutely real unity of the Self to be nothing but non-existence go round in the world of saṁsāra engrossed in the objects of the senses even though they accept the Vedas as their authority. Then what to say of those who are naturally inclined to sense objects? Therefore, this path chalked out by Prajāpati should be understood by those worshipful souls who have renounced all attachments and who have entered the order of paramahaṁsa-parivrājakas and who are engaged in the study of the Vedānta.’<sup>2</sup>

VIII. xii. 2 and 3 also refer to samprasāda and emphasise its disembodiedness, attainment of its supreme Effulgence and remaining in its own nature, and it is said to be uttamapuruṣa. In the same way this self of deep sleep having arisen from the body and attaining to the supreme Effulgence remains in its own nature. He is the

<sup>1</sup> *nā ’ha khalu ayam bhagava evam sampratyātmānam jānāty ayam aham asmī ’ti no eve ’māni bhūtāni vināśam evā ’pīto bhavati nā ’ham atra bhogyam paśyāmī ’ti.*

<sup>2</sup> *tathā ’nye karmino bāhyaviṣayāpahṛtacetaso vedapramānā api paramārthasatyam ātmaikatvam vināśam iva indravan manyamānū ghatīyantravad ārohāvarohaprakāraiḥ anīsam bam-bhramanti. kim anye kṣudraṅjantavo vivekahīnāḥ svabhāvata eva bahirviṣayāpahṛtacetasaḥ. tasmād idam tyaktasarvabāhyai ’saṅvir ananyaśaraṇiḥ paramahaṁsaparivrājakaiḥ atyāśramibhir vedāntaviḥṅganaparair eva vedānīyam pūjyatamaiḥ prajāpatyam ce ’mam sampradāyam anusaradbhir upanibaddham prakaraṇacatuṣṭayena.*

uttamapuruṣa, the highest Being.<sup>1</sup> The samprasāda in the commentary is equated with the liberated soul. Like the rope from which the superimposition of the snake has been removed in the presence of light, the Ātman in the light of discrimination is said to have realized its own nature. The samprasāda in this state is said to have transcended the kṣara and the akṣara (the Impermanent and the Permanent) or the vyākṛta and the avyākṛta (the Manifest and the non-manifest) and is differentiated accordingly. The commentary also says that the samprasāda remaining in its own state becomes the self of all: *sa samprasāda svena rūpeṇa tatra svātmani svasthatayā sarv-ātmanabhūtaḥ paryeti*. Thus the Upaniṣad uses the same term for the serene self of deep sleep as well as for the liberated soul.

Later on in the same context, the absence of a second entity by the side of the Ātman in sleep is said to be equally applicable to the liberated soul as well. *yadyapi suṣupte tad uktam muktasyāpi sarvaikatvāt samāno dvitīyābhāvaḥ*. Thus, throughout the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, brahmavidyā has been taught by pointing to the experience of deep sleep. Samprasādavidyā is verily brahmavidyā.

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<sup>1</sup> *evam evai 'sa samprasādo 'smac charīrāt samutthāya param jyotir upasampadya svena rūpeṇā 'bhiniṣpadyate; sa uttamapuruṣaḥ.*

## 2. TAITTIRĪYA UPANIṢAD

### *Commentary on II. viii. 5*

In this Śāṅkara has pointed out that 'the non-perception in deep sleep is not due to concentration and absorption of the mind in one thing to the exclusion of other things as takes place in the waking state. For, in this state, there is total non-perception. The perception of other things in the waking and dream-states is due to nescience and disappears when knowledge arises. If it is said that in deep sleep also non-perception is due to nescience, we say no; because non-perception of a second thing is natural to the Ātman';<sup>1</sup> (because the Ātman is one without a second and is the 'all' of the waking and dream-states). Later on in the same context, the commentary says that vidyā and avidyā are not the attributes of the Ātman, because they could be cognized as objects by the mind. The passage referred to above says: 'If it is said that vidyā and avidyā are the attributes of the Ātman, we say no; because they are objects. Discrimination and non-discrimination like shapes and colours etc. are experienced directly in the mind. The directly perceived form is not the attribute of the witness. In the same way, avidyā also manifests itself in our experience in the form, 'I am ignorant', 'My knowledge is not clear' etc. In the same way, knowledge and discrimination are also directly experienced. Then again, the knower of Ātman imparts self-knowledge to others. Similarly, others grasp the same.

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<sup>1</sup> *suṣupte 'grahaṇam anyāsaktvad iti cet na sarvāgrahaṇāt jāgratsvapnayor anyasya grahaṇāt sattvam eve 'ti cet, na avidyā-kr̥tatvāj jāgratsvapnayoh. yad anyagrahaṇam jāgratsvapnayos tad avidyākr̥tam vidyābhāve 'bhāvāt. suṣupte 'grahaṇam api avidyākr̥tam iti cet, na svābhāvikatvāt.*

Therefore, vidyā and avidyā belong to the category of name and form. These names and forms are superimposed like day and night in the sun, but do not, in reality exist in it.<sup>1</sup> The conclusion that the Ātman is free from these when it is in its natural state as in deep sleep is legitimate; the mind also disappears in that state.

Here an objection may be raised: Even though the particular forms of avidyā (tūlāvidyā) such as jīva, jagat and Īśvara might disappear, the basic nescience (mūlāvidyā) might remain in deep sleep; the gross and subtle bodies (sthūla and sūkṣma śarīras) of the jīva might have merged or subsided, but the causal body (kāraṇa śarīra) might continue to remain; the vikṣepa (projection) such as names and forms might disappear, but the screen (āvaraṇa) may continue to exist; that is why we know nothing in deep sleep.

The answer to this objection is as follows: The bare fact of non-perception or non-cognition, called agrahaṇa or ajñāna in deep sleep is confounded with avidyā whose function is to set up a second thing in the self which is the distinguishing feature of the waking and dream. The rationalistic Vedānta does not deny this non-perception; only it says that the non-perception is due to non-duality;

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<sup>1</sup> vidyā 'vidyayos taddharmatvam iti cen na pratyakṣatvāt. vivekāvivekav rūpādivat pratyakṣau upalabhyate antahkaraṇasthau. na hi rūpasya pratyakṣasya sato draṣṭṛdharmatvam. avidyā ca svānubhavana rūpyate mūḍho 'ham aviviktaṁ mama vijñānam iti. tathā vidyāviveko 'nubhūyate upadiśanti cā 'nyebhya ātmano vidyāṁ budhāḥ tathā cā 'nye 'vadhārayanti. tasmān nāmarūpapakṣasyai 'va vidyāvidye nāmarūpe ca, nā 'tmadharmau. nāmarūpayor nirvahitā te yad antarā tad brahmaṁ iti śrutyantarat. te ca punar nāmarūpe savitāry ahorātre iva kalpīte na paramārthato vidyamāne.

there is not a second thing to perceive. If there were a second thing called *mūlāvidyā* or *kāraṇa-śarīra* or *āvaraṇa*, why should we not know it in deep sleep also, where the consciousness of the self is not lost? That the self does not lose its nature as consciousness has been already shown; otherwise we could not remember that we did not know anything in deep sleep. If it is said that what is not seen is the modification into names and forms of *avidyā* which have subsided, but not the basic material, *mūlāvidyā*, or *kāraṇa-śarīra*, the question may be asked why we should not perceive it? Can it be that a cow when standing may be seen, but not when it lies down? Can it be that the waves may be seen, but not the ocean when the waves subside? Can it be that objects may be seen, but not the screen which hides the objects from our view? If *avidyā*, nescience, even in potential seed form had existed, it should have been perceived, but experience says, we did not know anything. Therefore, the existence of a *mūlāvidyā* or *kāraṇa-śarīra* or *āvaraṇa* in deep sleep is only inferred in the waking state; it is contradicted by direct experience and therefore not acceptable to reason. The fact of *agrahaṇa* is confounded with *avidyā*; hence the above misunderstanding.

### 3. PRAŚNA UPANIṢAD

In this Upaniṣad the portion dealing with brahma-vidyā begins with the fourth chapter (the fourth praśna or question). Śāṅkara introduces this topic with the remark that having dealt with the subject of lower knowledge (aparāvidyā) in the previous three chapters the Upaniṣad now wishes to propound the absolute Reality which is different from means and ends divested of the prāṇas and mind and unknown to the senses, auspicious, serene, unmodified, indestructible, unprojected either inwardly or outwardly, known as the puruṣa and which is to be realized by higher knowledge (parāvidyā). The question is: *kasmin sarve sampratiṣṭhitāḥ?* What is that in which all these are established? The teacher Pippalāda answers Gārgya's question thus: 'All these (the whole of this objective universe) gets unified in the supreme Being called Mind. It is on account of that that in that state called deep sleep (suṣṭi) the person hears not, sees not, smells not, tastes not, enjoys not, evacuates not, moves not about.'<sup>1</sup> The third mantra says that only the prāṇas or the physical forces are said to function in the body in that state. In the fourth mantra, the udāna is said to bring the yajamāna of this state to Brahman as in a sacrifice. The sacrificer is taken to svarga by the priest. The fifth mantra says that the dream world consists of things experienced as well as unexperienced in the waking state and the puruṣa's self-effulgence is manifest as the witness of that state. The sixth mantra describes the state of

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<sup>1</sup> *tat sarvam pare deve manasy ekī bhavati tena tarhy eṣa puruṣo na śṛṇoti, na paśyati, na jighrati, na rasayate, na sprśate, nā 'bhivadate, nā 'datte nā 'nandayate, na visṛjate, ne 'yāyate svapitī 'ty ācakṣate.*

suṣṭi: 'When the soul is overwhelmed by effulgence of the self there this bright being does not see any dream. There is only one uniform all-pervading light, so that one object could not be distinguished from another. Then here in this body arises this bliss.'<sup>1</sup> The commentary explains when the tendencies of the mind are rejected or obstructed by the fluid called pitta, then the rays of the mind get withdrawn into the heart. When the mind thus spreads over the whole of the body without any particularised form of cognition, then takes place what is known as deep sleep. This deva known as mind does not see any dream, because the effulgence has blocked the doors of perception. When the consciousness thus pervades the whole body, then it becomes serene; then it is that this bliss of deep sleep takes place. Further, it is said in this state the senses and the mind which are conditioned by avidyā, kāma, and karma completely subside. When they thus subside, the self which was imagined differently from its own nature on account of the limiting adjuncts (the body and the senses) becomes one without a second, all-auspicious and perfectly calm.<sup>2</sup> The seventh mantra

<sup>1</sup> *sa yadā tejasā 'bhībhūto bhavati atrai 'ṣa devaḥ svapnān na paśyati athai 'tasmin śarīra etat sukhaṁ bhavati.*

<sup>2</sup> *sa yadā manorūpo devo yasmin kāle saureṇa pittākhyena tejasā nādiśayena sarvato 'bhībhūto bhavati tiraskṛtavāsanādvāro bhavati. tadā saha karaṇair manaso raśmayo hṛdy upasamhṛtā bhavanti, yadā mano dārvagnivad aviśeṣavijñānarūpeṇa kṛtsnam śarīraṁ vyūpyā 'vatiṣṭhate tadā suṣupto bhavati. atrai 'tasmin kāle eṣa mana-ākhyo devaḥ svapnān na paśyati darśanadvārasya niruddhatvāt tejasā. atha tadai 'tasmiñ śarīra etat sukhaṁ bhavati yad vijñānaṁ nirābādham aviśeṣeṇa śarīravayūpakam prasannaṁ bhavati 'ty arthaḥ. etasmin kāle 'vidyākāmakarmanibandhanāni kāryakāraṇāni śāntāni bhavanti. teṣu śānteṣv ātma-*

says that all the universe enters into the supreme Self in that state just as birds return to their nests at the end of the day.<sup>1</sup> In the eighth mantra, the whole universe consisting of senses and sense-objects are said to enter into the supreme Self. The ninth mantra says that this soul, the seer who sees, touches, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, knows, does, is the embodied consciousness called *puruṣa*, the person. He gets established in the supreme Self.<sup>2</sup> In the commentary this entrance into the self is compared to the re-entrance of the image of the sun into itself when the water in which it is reflected is dried up.<sup>3</sup> The tenth mantra emphasises that that which is attained by the knower of the self as free from *avidyā*, as disembodied, as without attributes, as pure and immortal and real is the supreme Being Itself. Such an one becomes all-knowing; he becomes all. The next mantra also emphasises the fruit of this knowledge of the self in which the *jīva* along with the senses and *prāṇas* with their embodied specific consciousness called *devas* are re-absorbed in the state of *suṣupti* as all-knowingness and all-pervadingness. This is the *sarvātmabhāva*, the supreme goal of *parāvidyā* announced at the beginning of the chapter.

That the reference was to *suṣupti* and not to any other state has been emphasised by Śaṅkara in the introduction to the sixth *praśna* thus: 'It has been already

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*svarūpam upādhibhir anyathā vibhāvya mānam advayam ekaṁ  
sivam śāntam bhavati.*

<sup>1</sup> *sa yathā somya vayāmsi vāsoṃkṣaṁ sampratīṣṭhante,  
evam ha vai tat sarvaṁ para ātmani sampratīṣṭhate.*

<sup>2</sup> *eṣa hi draṣṭā spraṣṭā śrotā ghrātā rasayitā mantā boddhā  
kartā vijñānātmā puruṣaḥ. sa pare 'kṣara ātmani sampratīṣṭhate.*

<sup>3</sup> *sa ca jalasūryakādīpratibimbasya sūryādīpraveśavaj  
jagadādhāraśoṣe pare 'kṣara ātmani sampratīṣṭhate.*

said that this whole universe of causes and effects along with the jīvātman is re-absorbed into the supreme paramātman during the state of deep sleep.<sup>1</sup> It is also pointed out that this compels us to conclude that the same truth, that the universe enters into and comes back from the supreme Being at dissolution, pralaya, and re-emergence, sṛṣṭi, holds good.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *samastam jagat kāryakāraṇalakṣaṇam saha vijñānātmanā parasminn akṣare susuptikāle sampratiṣṭhata ity uktam.*

<sup>2</sup> *sāmarthyāt pralaye 'pi tasminn evā 'kṣare sampratiṣṭhate jagat tata evo 'tpadyata iti ca siddham bhavati.*

#### 4. BRHADĀRANYAKA UPANIṢAD

This Upaniṣad and Śaṅkara's commentary on it give a very elaborate analysis of the experience of deep sleep. To start with, (II.i.16) Ajātaśatru asks Gārgya about the nature of deep sleep in order to provoke him to enquire into it. In the commentary Śaṅkara remarks: The Ātman has to be pointed out when free from the aggregate of action, agent and the result of action before waking up. Before awaking, (in profound sleep) the puruṣa perceives nothing whatsoever like pleasure and so forth, which are the effects of past work. Therefore, not being affected by past work, we understand that that is the very nature of the Self. In order to teach that the Self was in its own nature and that only when one deviates from it, it becomes contrary to its nature, subject to transmigration, Ajātaśatru asks Gārgya who was abashed with a view to enlighten him on the point.<sup>1</sup>

In mantra II.i.16, Ajātaśatru says that this vijñānamaya-puruṣa (being with limited consciousness, jīva) lies in the hṛdayākāśa (space in the heart) wherein the prāṇas (vital forces), the speech, the senses and the mind are all absorbed. The puruṣa is then said to have gone into sleep: *etat puruṣa svapiti nāma*. The commentary says that ākāśa here means the Supreme Self which is identical with the jīva's own life. It lies in that supreme Self which

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<sup>1</sup> *prāk pratibodhāt kriyākārakaphalaviparītasvabhāva ātme 'ti kāryābhāvena didarśayiṣitam. na hi prāk pratibodhāt karmādikāryaṃ sukhāli kiñcana gṛhyate. tasmād akarma-prayuktatvāt tathā svābhāvyaṃ eva ātmano 'vagamyate, yasmin svābhāvye 'bhūt yataś ca svābhāvyaṃ pracyutaḥ saṃsārī svabhāva-vilakṣaṇa ity etadvivakṣayā pṛcchati gārgyaṃ pratibhānarahitaṃ buddhivyutpādanāya.*

is its own nature and transcends birth and death, not in the ordinary ether, for there is another śruti in its support, 'With existence, my dear, it is then united' (*Chānd.VI.viii.1*). The idea is that it gives up its individualised form which is created by its connection with the limiting adjuncts—the subtle body—and remains in its undifferentiated natural absolute Self.<sup>1</sup> A few lines further on, the commentary says that the organs being absorbed, the self rests in its own Self, for, then, it is no more changed into action, its factors, and its results.<sup>2</sup>

In II.i.19, the jīva is said to attain the acme of bliss. 'Now when he goes into deep sleep, then he knows nothing. . . . verily as a youth or a great king or a great brahmin might rest when he has reached the summit of bliss.'<sup>3</sup> The commentary says later on 'when in deep sleep the soul attains to its natural serenity, it gives up, like water, the impurity due to contact with other things'. The Self is again said to have no connection with the body as having transcended all desires and as being free from sorrows.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *ākāśasabdena para eva sva ātmo 'cyate tasmīn sve ātmany ākāśe śete svābhāvike 'sāmsārike. na kevale ākāśa eva śrutyan-tarasāmarthyāt satā somya tadā sampanno bhavati iti. liṅgo-pādhisambandhakṛtam viśeṣātmasvarūpam utsrjya aviśeṣe svābhāvike ātmany eva kevale vartata ity abhiprāyaḥ.*

<sup>2</sup> *tasmād upasamhṛteṣu vāgādīṣu kriyākārakaphalātmatā-bhāvāt svātmaṣṭha eva ātmā bhavati 'ty avagamyate.*

<sup>3</sup> *atha yadā suṣupto bhavati, yadā na kasyacana veda . . . sa yathā kumāro vā mahārājo vā mahābrāhmaṇo vā 'tighnīm ānandasya gatvā śayitai 'vam evai 'ṣa etac chete.*

<sup>4</sup> *yadā yasmin kūle suṣuptaḥ samprasādam svābhāvyaṁ gato bhavati, salilam iva anyasambandhakūluṣyaṁ hitvā svābhāvyaena prasīdati. na hi suṣuptikāle śarīrasambandho 'sti.*

The import of this section is explained in the commentary thus: (In *suṣupti*) the self was not in any place different from itself nor did it come from any place different from itself; nor is there in the self any means different from itself. What then is the import? That the self was in its own Self. This is borne out by the *śruti* passages—‘It merges in itself’ (*Chānd. VI. viii. 1*), ‘With existence, my dear, it is then united’ (*Ibid*), ‘Fully embraced by the Supreme Self’ (*Br. IV. iii. 21*), ‘Rests on the Supreme Self’ (*Praśna, IV. 7*) etc. For the same reason it does not come from any place different from itself. This is shown by the text itself. ‘From this Self etc., for there is no other entity besides the Self.’<sup>1</sup>

The Upaniṣad in II.i.20 also repeats that it is from this *Ātman* of deep sleep that all energies, worlds, gods and beings arise and that it has the secret name of the Real of the real, *satyasya satyam*, that is to say: the Personal God, the source of all vital energies from whom the whole universe comes into existence has got his reality in the

*tīrṇo hi tadā sarvāṅ chokān hṛdayasya iti hi vakṣyati. sarvasaṁsārādūḥkhaviyuktā iyaṁ avasthe 'ty atra drṣṭāntaḥ.....  
ayaṁ svābhāvike sve ātmani sarvasaṁsāradharmātīto vartate  
svāpakāla iti.*

<sup>1</sup> *nā 'yam ātmā anyo 'nyatrā 'bhūd anyo vā anyasmād āgataḥ sādhanāntaraṁ vā ātmany asti. kim tarhi svātmany evā 'bhūt; svam ātmānam apīto bhavati (Chānd. VI. viii. 1), satā somya tadā sampanno bhavati (Chānd. VI. viii. 1), prājñenā 'tmanā sampariṣvaktāḥ (Br. IV. iii. 21), para ātmani sampratiṣṭhate (Praśna, IV. 7) ity ādi śrutibhyaḥ. ata eva nā 'nyo 'nyasmād āgacchati — tat śrutyai 'va pradarsyate asmād ātmanaḥ (in the next Brāhmaṇa) iti. ātmavyatirekeṇa vastvantarā bhāvāt.*

Impersonal Self (revealed in dreamless sleep) the absolutely Real.<sup>1</sup>

We next come to IV.iii.18. In the introduction to this, the explanation for dealing with the three states, waking, dream and sleep is said to be that they reveal that the self is unattached. 'How do we know that the self is unattached? Because it moves as it were by turn from the waking to the dream-state, from this to the state of profound sleep, and from that again to the dream-state, then to the waking and again to the dream-state and so on which proves that it is distinct from the three states.' In the preceding paragraphs, the self-luminous Ātman which is different from the body and organs has been stated to be distinct from desire and work, for it moves alternately to the three states. These relative attributes do not belong to it *per se*; its relative existence is only due to its limiting adjuncts and is superimposed by ignorance. This has been stated to be the gist of the whole passage. There, however, the three states of waking, dream and profound sleep have been described separately, not shown together as a group. For instance, it has been shown that in the waking state the self appears through ignorance as connected with attachment, death, (work) and the body and organs; in the dream-state, it is perceived as connected with desire, but free from the forms of death; in the state of profound sleep, it is perfectly serene and unattached, this non-attachment being the additional feature. If we consider all these passages together, the result is that the self is by nature eternal, free, enlightened and pure. This

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<sup>1</sup> *sa yatho 'rṇanābhis tantuno 'ccared yathā 'gneḥ kṣudrā viṣphuliṅgā vyuccaranty evam evā 'smād ātmanah sarve prānāḥ sarve lokāḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni vyuccaranti tasyo 'paniṣat satyasya satyam iti prāṇā vai satyam teṣām eṣa satyam.*

comprehensive view has not yet been shown. Hence, the next paragraph. It will be stated later on that the Self becomes such only in the state of profound sleep. 'That form of his is beyond desire, free from evils and fearless.' As it is such, *i.e.*, unique, the Self desires to enter this state<sup>1</sup>.

Mantra 19 says that the Self in the state of *suṣupti* is free from desires, and free from all kinds of particularised forms of perception, *i.e.*, *svapna* which includes according to Śāṅkara the waking state also.<sup>2</sup> In the commentary, the *Ātman* in this State is said to be distinct from all relative attributes and devoid of all exertion caused by action with its factors and results.<sup>3</sup>

The introduction to the next mantra (20) is very significant. If *avidyā* were attached to the Self, in all the three states, it would follow that the *ātman* is never free from it, and liberation would be impossible. It is, therefore, necessary to show that there is at least one experience in our life which demonstrates to us that the Self is free from *avidyā*. Therein alone the *Ātman* stands revealed in its own nature. 'If this freedom from the attributes of *saṁsāra* is Its (*Ātman*'s) own nature, then it follows that

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<sup>1</sup> *suṣupte punaḥ samprasanno asaṅgo bhavati 'ty asaṅgatā 'pi dṛśyate. ekavākyatayā tū 'pasaṁhriyamāṇam phalaṁ nitya-muktabuddhaśuddhasvabhāvatū 'sya nai 'ktra puñjīkṛtya pradarśite 'ti tatpradarśanāya kaṇḍikā 'rabhyate. suṣupte hy evaṁrūpatā 'sya vakṣyamāṇā tad vā asyai 'tad aticchandā apahatapāpmā 'bhayaṁ rūpam iti. yasmād evaṁrūpaṁ vilakṣaṇam suṣuptam pravivikṣati.*

<sup>2</sup> *yatra supto na kañcana kāmam kāmāyate na kañcana svapnam paśyati.*

<sup>3</sup> *sarvasaṁsāradharmavilakṣaṇam sarvakriyākārakaphalā-yūśaśūnyam svam ātmānam praviśati.*

the attributes of saṃsāra are due to limiting adjuncts other than itself. Is this avidyā natural to the Self, or is it only adventitious, like desires, activities, etc? If it is only adventitious, then liberation is possible. Well, is there any data for proving that it is adventitious? Or, how is avidyā not natural to the Self? The next section is begun to ascertain the real nature of avidyā which is the cause of all miseries.<sup>1</sup>

Here avidyā is said to be āgantuka, that which comes and goes. Whenever it is <sup>sup</sup>to be anādi, beginningless, it means that we cannot trace its beginning; for beginning implies time, and time is experienced only in the waking when there is avidyā. Time-sense is within avidyā, and in this sense alone can avidyā be said to be beginningless. The refutation of the doctrine of *basic nescience* (mūlāvidyā) is implied in this above passage. If avidyā comes (as in the waking and dream-states) and goes (as in suṣupti), then only is liberation possible.

Mantra 20 indicates the nature of vidyā and avidyā and also the highest plane to which the human consciousness could rise. 'Now when one feels in a dream, he is being killed, overpowered or driven by an elephant and falls into a pit and when he sees any other object of fear which he saw in the waking state, all that is considered as happening on account of avidyā. Then when he thinks he

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<sup>1</sup> *yadi asyā 'yam svabhāvaḥ sarvasaṃsāradharmasūnyatā, paropādhinimittam cā 'sya saṃsāradharmivam, yannimittam cā 'sya paropādhikṛtam saṃsāradharmivam, sū cā 'vidyā. tasyā avidyāyāḥ kiṃ svābhāvikatvam āhosvit kāmakarmādivad āgantukatvam? yadi cā 'gantukatvam, tato vimokṣa upapadyate. tasyāś cā 'gantukatve ko 'papattiḥ, katham vā nā 'tmadharmo 'vidyā, iti sarvānarthaḥ abhūtāyā avidyāyāḥ satattvādvadhāraṇārtham parā kaṇḍikā ārabhyate.*

is a god or a king, or when he thinks, "I am all this" that is his highest world or plane of existence.<sup>1</sup> Says the commentary: 'Where ignorance is eliminated, and knowledge reaches its perfection, the state of identity with all, which is another name for liberation, is attained. That is to say, just as the self-effulgence of the Ātman is directly perceived, so is the result of knowledge. Similarly, when ignorance increases and knowledge vanishes, the results of ignorance also are directly perceived in dreams. "Now, when he feels as if he were overpowered or killed etc." Thus the results of knowledge and ignorance are identity with all and identity with finite things respectively. Through pure knowledge, a man is identified with all, sarvātmabhāva, and through ignorance he is identified with finite things or separated from something else. He is in conflict with that from which he is separated and because of this conflict, he is killed, overpowered or pursued. All this takes place, because the results of ignorance, being finite things, are separated from him. But if he is All, what is there from which he may be separated so as to be in conflict, by whom would he be killed, overpowered or pursued? Hence the nature of ignorance proves to be this: that it represents that which is infinite as finite, presents other things that are non-existent, and makes the Self appear as limited. Hence arises the desire for that from which he is separated; desire prompts him to action which produces results. This is the gist of the whole passage.'

This sarvātmabhāva of the vidyā state is only a

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<sup>1</sup> *atha yatrai 'nam ghnantī 'va jīnantī 'va hastī 'va vicchāyayati gartam iva patati yad eva jāgradbhayaṃ paśyati tad atrā 'vidyayā manyate 'tha yatra deva iva rūje 'vā 'ham eve 'dam sarvo 'smī 'ti manyate so 'sya paramo lokah.*

reflection of the sarvātmabhāva of the deep sleep state. The difference between the two is the difference between experience and knowledge, between anubhava and jñāna. That which is implicit in experience is made explicit by vicāra in terms of thought or vṛttijñāna.

Mantra IV.iii.21 teaches that the Self in this state goes beyond all desires, beyond all imperfections, beyond dharma and adharma and all fear, that it knows neither inside nor outside, that in this state of suṣupti it has attained to all its desire, that the Self alone has become its own object of desire and is beyond all miseries.<sup>1</sup>

In the commentary the following points may be noted :

1. That suṣupti is the attainment of totality of existence by the Self, sarvātmabhāva.
2. That it is the state of liberation, mokṣa.
3. That it is the same as the result of knowledge, vidyāphalam.
4. That it is free from action, agency and results, kriyākārahakaphalaśūnya.
5. That therein there is neither avidyā, kāma nor karma.
6. That this state is represented as a direct verification, in our experience, of the Self.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *tad vā asyai 'tad aticchandā apahatapāpmā 'bhayaṃ rūpam . . . . ayaṃ puruṣaḥ prājñēnā 'tmanā sampariṣvaktō na bāhyaṃ kiñcana veda nā 'ntaraṃ tad vā asyai 'tad āptakāmam ātmakāmam akāmam rūpam śokāntaram.*

<sup>2</sup> *idānīm yo 'sau sarvātmabhāvo mokṣo vidyāphalam kriyākārahakaphalaśūnyam, sa pratyakṣato nirdiśyate yatrā 'vidyākāmakarmāṇi na santi. tad etat prastutam—yatra supto na kañcana kāmam kāmāyate na kañcana svapnam paśyati iti.*

7. That by the denial of fear, its cause, *viz.*, nescience, is also denied.<sup>1</sup>

8. That as mantra 21 says, the ignorance of deep sleep is not due to avidyā, but due to unity. In sleep the jīvātman is said to have been completely in the embrace of the paramātman. 'As the Ātman is thus not lost in suṣupti it remains in its own form. If it is asked why one does not know the Self then as "I am this", nor these external things, as in waking or dream, the śruti replies thus: Hear the reason for the ajñāna (non-cognition). Unity is the only reason for this non-cognition. . . . . just as in the parallel instance, so this puruṣa or kṣetrajña free from all contact with objects. . . . . having been fully embraced by this his own absolutely real nature, by the effulgent supreme Being, having become one with him, the All-Self without a break, does not know another object outside, nor himself as "I am happy", "I am unhappy".'<sup>2</sup>

9. That the perception of multiplicity is due to particularised forms of knowledge brought about by nescience. That is absent in deep sleep. Hence the

<sup>1</sup> bhayaṁ hi nāmā 'vidyākāryam. avidyayā bhayaṁ manyate iti hy uktam. tatkāryadvāreṇa kāraṇapraṭiṣedho 'yam. abhayaṁ rūpam ity avidyāvarjitam ity etat.

<sup>2</sup> sa yady ātmā atrā 'vinaṣṭaḥ svenai 'va rūpeṇa vartate kasmād ayam aham asmī 'ty ātmānaṁ vā bahir ve 'māni bhūtānī 'ti jāgratsvapnayoḥ iva na jānānī 'ty atro 'cyate. śrṇv atrā 'jñānahetum. ekatvam evā 'jñānahetuḥ. tat katham ity ucyate. drṣṭāntena hi pratyakṣībhavati. vivakṣito 'rtha ity āha . . . . . evam eva yathā drṣṭānto 'yam puruṣaḥ kṣetrajño bhūtāmātrā-saṁsargataḥ . . . . . so 'yam puruṣaḥ prājñena paramārthena svābhāvikenā svenā 'tmanū pareṇa jyotiṣā sampariṣvaktāḥ ekībhūto nirantaraḥ sarvātmā, na bāhyaṁ kiñcana vastvantaram nā 'py āntaram ātmani ayam aham asmi sukhī duḥkhī ve 'ti veda.

experience of unity. 'There by implication it was shown that multiplicity is caused by particularised forms of cognition and this multiplicity is due to avidyā which sets up objects other than the Self, where the Self is completely free from avidyā, then it becomes one with all. Therefore, when there is no division of knower, known and object, where is the scope for desire on account of the absence of particularised knowledge in this self-sufficient natural form of the Self?'<sup>1</sup> This point is important to remember, as this is the very core of the argument for Advaita. Of the two other possible explanations for non-cognition in deep sleep, avidyā and non-existence of the Self, neither of them is accepted by Śaṅkara and the same point will be expanded by the Upaniṣad. The difference between ajñāna and avidyā may also be noted. Not knowing anything whatsoever—Self or non-Self—is ajñāna; knowing something as other than the Self is avidyā; it consists of adhyāsa or super-imposition; ajñāna here is the same as agraḥaṇa.

**10.** Why the Self alone is the object of desire? It is said to be desiring its own Self; because there is no avidyā producing a second thing to desire. Therefore this form of the Self is free from desire, because of the absence of any object.<sup>2</sup>

**11.** In this form the Self is said to attain to the

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<sup>1</sup> *tatrā 'rthād nānātvaṁ viśeṣavijñānaḥetur ity uktam bhavati. nānātve ca kā-aṇam—ātmano vastvantarasya pratyupasthāpikā 'vidye 'ty uktam. tatra cā 'vidyāyā yadā pravivikto bhavati tadā sarveṇai 'katvam evā 'sya bhavati. tataś ca jñānajñeyādikā rakavibhāge 'sati kuto viśeṣavijñānaprādurbhāvaḥ kāmo vā sambhavati svābhāvike svarūpastha ātmajyotiṣi.*

<sup>2</sup> *anyatvapratyupasthāpakahetur avidyāyā abhāvād ātmakāmam. ata evā 'kāmam etad rūpaṁ kāmyaviśayābhāvāt.*

fulfilment of all its desires (āptakāma), because it has attained to all objects of desire in this state.<sup>1</sup>

The absence of avidyā in suṣupti is emphasised thrice in the course of the commentary to this mantra.

IV. iii. 22 says that the Self in this state (suṣupti) is free from all adjuncts and attributes of varṇa, āśrama and saṁskāra and all kinds of relationships. Thus a father ceases to be a father, a śramaṇa ceases to be a śramaṇa, a caṇḍāla ceases to be a caṇḍāla, a hermit ceases to be a hermit etc. The Self is untouched by good work as well as evil work and is free from all woes.<sup>2</sup> The commentary on this repeats that the Ātman which is self-effulgent, is free from avidyā, kāma and karma and that its non-perception in deep sleep even while retaining its self-effulgence is not adventitious but is due to attainment of unity, and this again is said to be directly experienced by us. Further, this form of the Ātman is said to be beyond all relations which is but a statement of fact.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> *yasmād evaṁ sarvaikatvam evā 'sya rūpam atas tad vā asyā 'tmanah svayamjyotiḥsvabhāvasyai 'tad rūpam āptakāmam; yasmāt samastam etat tasmād āptāḥ kāmā asmiṁ rūpe tad idam āptakāmam.*

<sup>2</sup> *atra pitā 'pitā bhavati mātā 'mātā lokā alokā devā adevā vedā avedāḥ. atra steno 'steno bhavati bhrūṇahā 'bhrūṇahā caṇḍālo 'caṇḍālah paṅkaso 'paṅkasaḥ śramaṇo 'śramaṇas tāpaso 'tāpaso 'nanvāgataṁ puṇyenā 'nanvāgataṁ pāpena tīrṇo hi tadā sarvāṅ chokān hṛdayasya bhavati.*

<sup>3</sup> *prakṛtaḥ svayamjyotir ātmā 'vidyākāmakarmavinirmukta ity uktam . . . . vidyamānasyai 'va svayamjyotiṣṭvasya suṣupte 'grahaṇam ekībhāvādd hetoḥ na tu kāmakarmādivad āgantukam . . . . atra cai 'tat prakṛtam avidyākāmakarmavinirmuktam eva tad rūpam yat suṣupte ātmano gṛhyate pratyakṣata iti. tad etat yathābhūtam evā 'bhīhitam sarvasambandhātītam etat rūpam iti.*

IV. iii. 23 to 32 is a piece of bold reasoning on the part of the śruti itself as to why a second thing is not experienced in deep sleep which has been already indicated by Śāṅkara in the commentary. Explaining the object of this section (23 to 32), the commentary says: 'Self-effulgence is being pure intelligence by nature. Now, the question is: If this intelligence is the very nature of the Self, like the heat of fire, how should it, in spite of the unity, give up its nature and fail to know, and if it does not give up its nature, how is it that it does not see in profound sleep? It is self-contradictory to say that intelligence is the nature of the Self and again that it does not know. The answer is that it is not Self-contradictory. Both these are possible. How?\*' Says the Upaniṣad: 'That it does not see in that state is because although seeing there, it does not see; for the vision of the witness can never be lost, because it is immortal. But there is not a second thing separate from it which it can see.'<sup>1</sup> The very same argument is repeated with regard to smelling, tasting, speaking, hearing, thinking, touching and knowing. 'When there is something else, as it were, then one can see something, one can smell something, one can taste something, one can speak something, one can think something, one can touch something, one can know something.'<sup>2</sup>

The reasoning is quite straight. The following thoughts occur in the commentary by way of explanation:

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<sup>1</sup> *yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati na hi draṣṭur draṣṭer viparilopo vidyate 'vināśitvāt, na tu taddvītyam asti tato 'nyad vibhaktam yat paśyeta.*

<sup>2</sup> *yatra vā anyad iva syāt tatrā 'nyo 'nyat paśyed anyo 'nyaj jighred anyo 'nyad rasayed anyo 'nyad vaded anyo 'nyac chṛṇuyād anyo 'nyan manvītā 'nyo 'nyat sprśed anyo 'nyad vijānīyāt.*

‘Those things that cause the particular visions (of the waking and dream-states) viz., the mind, the eyes and forms were all presented by nescience (avidyā) as something different from the Self. They are now unified in the state of profound sleep as the individual self has been embraced by the supreme Self.’

Hence, the organs and objects do not stand as different entities, and since they are absent, there is no particularised experience, for it is the product of the organs etc., not of the Self, and only appears as the product of the Self. Therefore, this mistake is committed, viz., the vision of the Self is lost.<sup>1</sup>

Another point to be noted is the import of the word ‘iva’ in *yatra vā anyad iva syāt* (Br. U. IV.iii.31). The seeing of a second thing is qualified by ‘as it were’ meaning thereby that the division in the non-dual Self into ‘I’ and ‘This’ is unreal. The world of the senses and the mind is conjured up by avidyā which is, therefore, a delusion, not real. This takes place only in the waking and dream, and therefore it is that Śaṅkara always speaks of avidyā only in connection with jāgrat and svapna and insists that the suṣupti-state is free from this avidyā, where there is only one non-dual existence. The following quotation from the commentary will make this point clear: ‘It has been said that in this state of profound sleep there is not as in the waking and dream-states that second thing

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<sup>1</sup> *yadd hi tad viśeṣadarśanakāraṇam antaḥkaraṇam cakṣū rūpam ca tadavidyayā ’nyatvena pratyupasthāpitam āsīt. tad etasmin kāle ekībhūtam. ātmanaḥ pareṇa pariṣvangāt . . . . tena na pṛthaktvena vyavasthitāni karaṇāni viśayās ca. tadbhāvād viśeṣadarśanam nā ’sti. karaṇādikṛtam hi tan nā ’tmakṛtam. ātmakṛtam iva pratyavabhāsate. tasmāt tatkrte ’yam bhrāntiḥ ātmano dr̥ṣṭiḥ parilupyata iti.*

differentiated from the Self which it can know. Hence, it knows no particulars in profound sleep; here it is objected: If this is its nature, why does it give up that nature and have particularised knowledge? If, on the other hand, it is its nature to have this kind of knowledge, why does it not know particulars in the state of profound sleep? The answer is this: When in the waking or dream-state, there is something else besides the Self, as it were, presented by nescience, then one, thinking of oneself as different from that something—although there is nothing different from the Self, nor is there any Self different from it—can see something. This has been shown by a reference to one's experience in the dream state in the passage, "As if he were killed or overpowered". Similarly one can smell, taste, speak, hear, think, touch and know something where there is something else as it were.<sup>1</sup> This position of the śruti is further confirmed by Śaṅkara in the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, verses 170 and 171. In dreams, when there is no actual contact with the external world, the mind alone creates the whole universe consisting of the enjoyer, etc. And similarly in the waking state also; there is no difference.

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<sup>1</sup> *jāgratsvapnayor iva yad vijānīyāt tat dviītyam pravibhaktam anyatvena nā 'stī 'ty uktam. atah suṣupte na vijānāti viśeṣam. nanu yady asyā 'yam eva svabhāvaḥ kinnimittam asya viśeṣavijñānam svabhāvaparitāyāgena? atha viśeṣavijñānam evā 'sya svabhāvaḥ, kasmād eṣa viśeṣam na vijānāti 'ti? ucyate śṛṇu. yatra yasmiñ jāgarite svapne vā anyad iva ātmano vastvantaram iva avidyayā pratyupasthāpitam bhavati, tatra tasmād avidyāpratyupasthāpitād anyah anyam iva ātmānam manyamānaḥ asati ātmanaḥ pravibhakte vastvantare 'sati cā 'tmani tataḥ pravibhakte anyo 'nyat paśyeduḥpalabheta. tat ca darśitam svapne pratyakṣato ghnantī 'va jīnantī 'va iti. tathā 'nyo 'nyaj jighred rasayed vadec chr̥ṇuyān manvīta spr̥śed vijānīyād iti.*

Therefore, all this (phenomenal universe) is the projection of the mind. In dreamless sleep when the mind is merged in the Ātman there exists nothing (for the person asleep) as is evident from universal experience. Hence man's relative existence is simply the creation of the mind and has no objective reality.<sup>1</sup> Again, in śloka 405, Śāṅkara says: 'This duality is māyā. The Reality is non-dual. The śruti declares that this is directly experienced in deep sleep.'<sup>2</sup> Again, ślokas 107, 403 and 404 say: 'That in profound sleep we experience the bliss of Ātman independent of sense-objects is clearly attested by śruti, direct intuition, tradition and inference.'<sup>3</sup> 'How can the talk of diversity apply to the supreme Reality which is one and homogeneous? Who has ever noticed any diversity in the unmixed bliss of the state of profound sleep.'<sup>4</sup> 'Even before the realization of the highest Truth the universe does not exist in the absolute Brahman, the Essence of Existence. In none of the three states of time the snake is ever observed in the rope, nor a drop of water

<sup>1</sup> *svapne 'rthasūnye srjati svaśaktyā  
bhoktrādiviśvam mana eva sarvam  
tathai 'va jāgraty api no viśeṣas  
tat sarvam etanmanaso vijṛmbhaṇam.* (170)

*suṣuptikāle manasi pralīne  
nai 'vā 'sti kiñcit sakalaprasiddheḥ  
ato manahkalpita eva pumsaḥ  
saṁsāra etasya na vastuto 'sti.* (171)

<sup>2</sup> *māyāmātram idaṁ dvaitam advaitam paramārthataḥ  
iti brūte śrutiḥ sāksāt suṣuptāv anubhūyate.* (405)

<sup>3</sup> *yat suṣuptau nirviśaya ātmānando 'nubhūyate  
śrutipratyakṣam aitihiyam anumānam ca jāgrati.* (107)

<sup>4</sup> *ekātmake pare tattve bheda-vārtā katham vaset?  
suṣuptau sukhamātrāyām bhedaḥ kenā 'valokitah.* (403)

in the mirage.<sup>1</sup> It may be noted that Śaṅkara makes no difference here between the content of nirvikalpa-samādhi and suṣupti.

The function of avidyā and its absence in deep sleep is again brought out in the following passage in the commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, IV. iii. 32: 'Then again where that avidyā which sets up a second thing other than the Self has quietened down, and where a second thing separated by avidyā is absent, who can see whom, who can smell whom, who can know whom. Having been fully embraced by its own nature, the self-effulgent Self having become completely serene, the Self having fulfilled all its desires, having no other object to desire, the seer remains one without a second like a mass of pure water; because a second thing is separated by avidyā and that is absent; therefore, it is one only.'<sup>2</sup> The śruti here proclaims in emphatic tones that that which is experienced in this state is Brahman itself. 'It becomes like one mass of water, the one witness, and one without a second. This is the world of Brahman, O Emperor!' Thus did

<sup>1</sup> *na hy asti viśvaṃ paratattvabodhāt  
sadātmani brahmaṇi nirvikalpe  
kālatraye nā 'py ahir īkṣito guṇe  
na hy ambubindur mṛgaṭṛṣṇikāyām.* (404)

<sup>2</sup> *yatra punaḥ sū' vidyā suṣupte vastvantarapratyupasthā-  
pikā śāntā, tenā 'nyatvena avidyāpravibhaktasya vastuno 'bhāvāt  
tat kena kaṃ paśyej jīghred vijānīyād vā. ataḥ svenai 'va  
hi prājñenā 'tmanā svayamjyotiḥsvabhāvena sampariśvaktāḥ  
samastāḥ samprasanna ūptakāmaḥ ātmakāmaḥ salilavat svacchī-  
bhūtaḥ salila iva salila eko dvitīyasyā 'bhāvāt. avidyayā hi  
dvitīyaḥ pravibhajyate. sā ca śānta 'tra ata ekaḥ. draṣṭā drṣṭer  
avipariluptatvād ātmajyotiḥsvabhāvāyāḥ. advaito draṣṭavyasya  
dvitīyasyā 'bhāvāt. eṭad amṛtam abhayam.*

Yājñavalkya instruct Janaka. 'This is its supreme attainment, this is its supreme glory, this is its highest world, this is its supreme bliss. On a particle of this bliss other beings live.'<sup>1</sup>

The world of Brahman is Brahman Itself and is the supreme: *brahmai 'va loko brahmalokaḥ*. Further, in profound sleep, the Self, bereft of its limiting adjuncts, the body and the organs, remains in its own supreme light of the Ātman free from all relations.<sup>2</sup> This is said to be the supreme attainment of the individual self, because the other attainments, characterised by the taking of a body, from the state of hiraṇyagarbha down to that of a clump of grass are created by ignorance and, therefore, inferior to this, being within the sphere of ignorance.<sup>3</sup> But this identification with all, in which one sees nothing else, is the highest of all attainments such as identity with the gods that are achieved through meditation and rites.<sup>4</sup> This is said to be the jīva's supreme glory, the highest of all its splendours, being natural to it; other glories are artificial.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *salila eko draṣṭā 'dvaito bhavaty eṣa brahmalokaḥ samrāḍ iti hai 'nam anuśāśāsa yājñavalkya eṣā 'sya paramā gatir eṣā 'sya paramā sampad eso 'sya paramo loka eṣo 'sya parama ānanda etasyai 'vā 'nandasya 'nyāni bhūtāni mātrām upajīvanti.*

<sup>2</sup> *para evā 'yam asmin kāle vyāvṛttakāryakaraṇopādhibhedah sve ātmajyotiṣi śāntasarvasambandho vartate he samrāt.*

<sup>3</sup> *eṣā 'sya vijñānamayasya paramā gatiḥ. yās tu aīyāḥ dehagrahaṇalakṣaṇāḥ brahmādistambaparyantā avidyākalpitās tā gatayo 'to 'paramā avidyāviṣayatvāt.*

<sup>4</sup> *iyam tu devatvādigatīnām karmavidyāsādhyānām paramottamā yaḥ samastātmabhāvo, yatra nā 'nyat paśyati nā 'nyac chr̥noti nā 'nyat vijānātī 'ti.*

<sup>5</sup> *eṣai 'va ca paramā sampat; sarvāsām sampadām vibhūtinām iyam paramā svābhāvikatvāt asyāḥ. kṛtakā hy anyāḥ sampadah.*

Likewise, this is its highest world as the other worlds which are the result of its past work, are inferior to it; this, however, is not attainable by any action, being natural. Hence, this is the highest world.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, this is its supreme bliss in comparison with other joys that are due to the contact of the organs with their objects, since this is eternal. For, another śruti says that that which is infinite is Bliss. 'That in which one sees something, . . . . . knows something, is puny, mortal, secondary joy.' But this is the opposite of that, this is its supreme bliss.<sup>2</sup> Other being including even Brahmā, the Creator, is said to live only on a particle of this very bliss, put forward by ignorance, and perceived only during the contact of the organs with their objects. They are separated from that bliss by ignorance and are considered, therefore, different from Brahman. Being thus different, they subsist on a fraction of that Bliss which is perceived through the contact of the organs with their objects.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *tathai 'ṣo 'sya paramo lokaḥ. ye 'nye karmaphalāśrayā lokās te 'smād aparamāḥ ayam tu na kenacana karmaṇā mīyate svābhāvikatvāt.*

<sup>2</sup> *tathai 'ṣo 'sya parama ānandaḥ. yāni anyāni viṣayendriyasambandhajanitāny ānandajātāni tāny apeksya eṣo 'sya parama ānando, nityatvāt. yo vai bhūmā tat sukhām iti śrutyantarat. yatrā 'nyat paśyati anyad vijānāti tad alpam martyam amukhyaṁ sukhām. idam tu tadviparītam. ata evai 'ṣo 'sya parama anandaḥ.*

<sup>3</sup> *etasyai 'vā 'nandasya mātrām kalām avidyāpratyupasthāpitām viṣayendriyasambandhakālavibhāvīyam anyāni bhūtāny upajīvanti. kāni tāni? tata evā 'nandād avidyayā pravibhajyamānasvarūpāny anyatvena tani bramhaṇaḥ prāikalpyamānāny anyāni santy upajīvanti bhūtāni viṣayendriyasamparkadvāreṇa vibhāvīyamānām.*

The importance of the enquiry into and study of the three states—waking, dream and sleep—in determining the metaphysical nature of the reality behind this ego and the universe and the supreme value of the study of the experience of deep sleep in helping us towards the realization of mokṣa are well brought out by Śaṅkara in his summing up of the preceding passages in the commentary to IV.iii.34. *‘It has also been stated that identity with all which is its nature—its transcendent form—in which it is free from all such relative attributes such as ignorance, desire and work—is directly experienced in the state of profound sleep. The Ātman is self-luminous and is the supreme Bliss. This is the subject-matter of knowledge; this is the perfectly serene state, and the culmination of happiness. All this has been explained by the foregoing passages.’*<sup>1</sup>

Next, is this experience of deep sleep an experience of mokṣa? If deep sleep is an experience of Brahman, as is repeatedly insisted on by śruti, and by Śaṅkara, then it follows that in deep sleep we experience mokṣa. We have already seen that it is not a semblance, but the Reality itself. Śaṅkara, therefore, says in the para next to the one quoted above, *tasmāt samprasādashānam mokṣadr̥ṣṭāntabhūtam*. And we actually find it is so; for in deep sleep, no kind of bondage is felt by anyone; where there is no individuality or personality or ego there can be no room for bondage. That is the significance of the passage, ‘There the father ceases to be a father, the mother ceases to be a

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<sup>1</sup> *tatra ca sarvātmabhāvaḥ svabhāvo ’sya, evam avidyākāma-karmādisarvasaṁsāradharmasambandhātītam rūpam asya sākṣāt suṣupte gr̥hyate ity etad vijñāpitam. svayamjyotir ātmai ’ṣa parama ānandaḥ. eṣa vidyāyā viśayaḥ. sa eṣa paramaḥ samprasādaḥ sukhasya ca parā kūṣṭhā. ity etad evam antena granthena vyākhyātam.*

mother, the brāhmaṇa ceases to be a brāhmaṇa' etc. There no father or mother is aware of his or her relations as a father or mother. The caṇḍāla is not aware of his status as a caṇḍāla. The śramaṇa is not conscious of his order of life and so he is then free from the rules of discipline imposed on him by virtue of his belonging to that order. In sleep no one thinks of his merit or demerit and he is free from the fruits of his good or bad deeds etc. One in sleep not being aware of his mind or body is completely free from all laws of nature. All of which show that we actually experience mokṣa in deep sleep. It is a direct demonstration that there is such a thing as mokṣa. If there were no suṣupti there would be no way of ascertaining that mokṣa is possible; in other words, suṣupti is the proof of mokṣa. What remains for us to do is to get a reflection or expression of this experience in the waking also which is known as jīvanmukti. This freedom of the Self is not experienced in the waking until we have reflected on the experience of deep sleep and made explicit in terms of ideas, the implications of that experience. *prājñe sukhaṁ samanubhūya samutthitah san sarvaprakāraṁ viṣayapratipatti-sūnye supto 'ham atra sukham ity anusandadhānaḥ sarvo 'pi jantur avagacchati tasya saukhyam (Saiṅkṣepaśārīrka, 23).*

To quote Śaṅkara again: If you say that unhappiness etc. is so strong that no one ever sees onself free from them, it is not so, because it is seen that identification with unhappiness etc. is delusive just as the identification with the body etc.; for we see that delusive is the identification that 'I am wounded,' 'I am burnt', when the body is wounded or burnt. So also we see that the idea, 'I am miserable', when one's sons or relatives are miserable is a superimposition. In the same way is it with the identification with the sorrows etc. of life; for these are seen to be outside consciousness (other than consciousness),

*because they do not accompany us in suṣupti.* On the other hand, the continued existence of consciousness is affirmed in the mantra, *yad vai tan na paśyati paśyan vai tan na paśyati*: 'That it does not see even while it sees etc., therefore, there is the experience of the nature of pure consciousness completely free from unhappiness etc. And in the case of one who *knows thus* there remains nought else to be done.'

That the śruti itself has admitted reason as the means to realization is evident in the section where Yājñavalkya reasons out advaita from the experience of suṣupti. More than that, the śruti seems to expressly enjoin re-examination of the experience as the necessary and only means for the attainment of jīvanmukti. In *Br. U.*, IV. iv. 13, 14 & 15, 19 & 20 the following words of the mantras indicate re-examination or vicāra of experience: (1) *yasyā 'nuṣṅittaḥ pratibuddha ātmā* . . . . . (2) *ihai 'va santo 'tha vidmas tad vayam* . . . . . (3) *yadai 'tam anupaśyati ātmānaṁ devam aṅjasā* . . . . (4) *manasai 'vā 'nudraṣṭavyam* . . . . (5) *ekadhai 'vā 'nudraṣṭavyam*. The use of the prefix 'anu' which means afterwards or 'again' will have little or no significance if it does not refer to an experience one already had. Therefore, the expressions indicate the mind moving over an experience (here, suṣupti already pointed out) which implies niṣprapañca-sadātma-tattva, the state of freedom from relative experience, the very nature of the Ātman. The word *pratibuddha* can be interpreted to mean 'having come back to the waking state', *ihai 'va* may be interpreted to mean 'even here in this waking state'.

## 5. BRAHMA-SŪTRA-BHAṢYA

That it is by reasoning on the experience of *suṣupti* as blessed by the *śruti* that we realize the Self as devoid of all relations is also mentioned by Śaṅkara in the commentary to *Brahma-sūtra* 6 in the first *pāda* of the second chapter, *drśyate tu*, beginning with *śravaṇavyatirekeṇa mananam vidadhat, śabda eva tarkam apy ādartavyam*.

‘The reasoning (*manana*) apart from hearing, (*śravaṇa*) enjoined by the *śruti* has been already shown to be that which has been accepted by *śruti*. The realization of the Self does not happen by dry fruitless logic. (Because, as we have shown in Part I of this book, logic is formal, based on assumptions and does not insist on observed and verified data as in science.) But here it is reasoning, *tarka*, blessed by *śruti* with experience (*anubhava*) forming its part, that is relied upon. (This is followed by citing the particular experience on which reasoning is based.) The waking and dream-states by mutual exclusion do not accompany the *Ātman*. In sleep by complete renunciation of the universe and by remaining as absolute existence, the *Ātman* is experienced as free from this world-projection; as the world has come out of Brahman (in the waking and dream) by the logic of the non-difference of cause and effect, it is non-different from Brahman. The reasoning sanctioned by the *śruti* is of this kind. The unreliability of mere logic (*kevala-tarka*) will be shown in the commentary on the *Sūtra*, *tarkā ’pratiṣṭhānāt* etc.

Most people are ready to quote the *Sūtra* in support of their belief in the fruitlessness of reasoning; but they fail to distinguish the kind of reasoning which Śaṅkara condemns as fruitless from that which he accepts. The distinction between logic and reason or scientific method has been accepted by western logicians also. It is this

superb rationality of the śruti that really makes it supremely authoritative in the world of metaphysics and in the search for absolute Truth. Even śruti, according to Śaṅkara will not be accepted as authority if it goes against experience, as for example, if it were to say that fire is cold. And whosoever goes against experience cannot be a philosopher.

There is a common point between the scientific method and Vedānta on one side, as against theologies, which makes the former acceptable to all, *viz.*, the universality of scientific data and scientific method. On account of this, scientific theories and doctrines have gained ground, whereas theological beliefs and dogmas have been progressively losing ground. Vedānta philosophy, as distinguished from Upaniṣadic theology, is based on universal experience and reason, and that is why any amount of logic cannot overthrow the conclusions of the Vedānta. To this effect says Śaṅkara: 'It is the conclusion of all those who advocate mokṣa that mokṣa is to be had by right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna*) and that (scientific) knowledge is of one form, because, it is governed by the object itself, (*vastutantra*). That object which remains ever in one form only is absolutely real. In the world, the knowledge with regard to it is said to be scientific knowledge as that "fire is hot". Since that is so, the not knowing this or contrary knowledge is unreasonable. Because Veda is eternal, and is productive of knowledge, because it produces the knowledge of the objects which it seeks to reveal, the validity of the knowledge thus produced is not to be overthrown by all the logicians of the past, present and future put together' (*vide* commentary on *tarkā 'pratiṣṭhānāt* etc. beginning with *api ca samyagjñānāt mokṣaḥ*, II. i. 11).

Śaṅkara's position with regard to reason is further

confirmed by the following commentary to *Sūtra* I.i.2 *janmād yasya yataḥ*.

‘The realization of Brahman is not to be brought out by inference etc., but only by enquiry into the meaning of the Upāṇiṣadic statements. When there are Vedāntic statements regarding the ultimate cause of the universe, inferential argument to confirm the pronouncement of the śruti are not objected to, the help of reason being admitted even by śruti. Thus ‘The Ātman is to be heard and reasoned upon’ (*Bṛ. U. II. iv. 5*). Also in *Chāndogya*, ‘The man with a teacher knows the truth’ (VI. xiv. 2) shows that the help of reason also must be taken to realize the Ātman, because in the matter of enquiry into Brahman, it is not the śruti alone that forms the authority as in the case of enquiry into duties, dharma. What else, then? Experience as well as scripture is authority here, because the realization of Brahman consummates in experience—*anubhavāvasānatvāt*—and also because the object of enquiry is already an existent thing and not to be brought about as in the case of duties. *vākyārthavicāraṇādhyavasānanirvṛttā hi brahmāvagatir nā ’numānādipramāṇāntoranirvṛttā* etc.

There is a note on ‘anubhavāvasāna’ by Ānandagiri which shows why reason is the more immediate means of realization than hearing and faith in the traditional teaching of the śruti:

‘Because it is as a means of liberation that realization of Brahman gains its importance. Of the two, scriptural authority and reason, (*śabda-tarka*), reason being more immediate and internal than the other which is based on other peoples’ realization, and being also of the same nature as one’s own experience (that is to say, being only an explicit presentation in the form of ideas or vṛttiñāna of what was implicit in one’s own experience), reason is of greater importance. Tradition, śruti, is external to one’s

own experience, whereas the other is internal being a part of one's own experience. Hence, reason is superior. A doubt may arise whether brahmajñāna also like dharma may not be productive of only unknown results in future; hence, how could reason, destroying wrong knowledge, end in experience? To this the reply is that it does end in the experience of mokṣa, just as by examining the mother of pearl, the superimposed idea of silver is destroyed, by reasoning, the inability to conceive the Reality is destroyed, (as it again goes over the experience of reality with a view to examine the contents of the experience, left overlooked till then). Reason is, therefore, the means of mokṣa, and therefore, does not have the defect of not immediately experiencing its result, as it is the case with dharma'.<sup>1</sup>

The utility of knowledge or philosophy of the suṣupti state is expressly stated by Śaṅkara as the ascertainment of the real nature of the jīva as Brahman and its freedom from the relative existence of the waking and dream-states in the commentary to *Śūtra* III. ii. 7. After a lengthy

<sup>1</sup> *brahmasākṣātkārasya mokṣopāyatayā prādhānyūt tatra śabdād api parokṣagocarād aparokṣārthasādharmyagocarās tarko 'ntaraṅgam iti tasyai 'va balavattvam ity arthaḥ. aitihiyamātreṇa pravādapāramparyamātreṇa. parokṣatīyēti yāvat. anubhavasya prādhānye tarkasyo 'ktanyāyena tasminn antaraṅgatvād āgamasya ca bahiraṅgatvāt antaraṅgabahiraṅgayor antaraṅgam balavat iti nyāyād uktaṃ tarkasya balavattvam. anubhavaprādhānyam tu nā 'dyā 'pi siddham ity āsaṅkyā 'ha—anubhave 'ti. nanu brahmajñānam vaidikatvād dharmavad adṛṣṭaphalam eṣṭavyam, tat kuto asyā 'nubhavāvasānāvidyānivartakatvam tatrā 'ha—mokṣe 'ti. adhīṣṭhānasākṣātkārasya śuktyādijñāne tadavidyātatkāryanivartakatvadṛṣṭer brahmajñānasyā 'pi tarka-vaśād asambhāvanādinirāsadvārā sāksātkāravāsāyinas tadavidyānivartakatvenai 'va muktihetute 'ti nā 'dṛṣṭaphalate 'ty arthaḥ.*

(Ānandagiri's gloss on anubhavāvasāna of Śaṅkarabhāṣya on *Brahmasūtra*, II. i. 4.)

discussion about the whereabouts of the soul in deep sleep, Śāṅkara comes to the following conclusion that the 'Ātman-brahman' is the sole locus of the soul in that state. 'That sat and prājña are Brahman is well known (from the śruti). In these śrutis three loci (of the jīva) in the suṣupti state are mentioned, the nerves, the heart and Brahman. There the nerves and the heart are meant as pathways, the only one locus is Brahman... I have already shown that Brahman is the unchanging locus. There is utility in this knowledge, viz., the ascertainment of the Truth, that jīva is Brahman and that it is free from the vyavahāra (relative experience and activities) of the dream and waking states. Therefore, the point of deep sleep is Brahman itself.'<sup>1</sup> The contention that suṣupti is not an experience of Brahman, but only an analogy is thereby disposed of. In this commentary, two more points may be noted, one of which is that jīva does not rest in the Ātman as a separate entity. From the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* expression *prājñenā 'tmanā sampariṣvaktāḥ* (embraced by the Supreme Self) we may be led to suppose that jīva though immediately close to the *Paramātman* and resting in it, is not yet one with it. To remove the possible wrong impression, Śāṅkara says: 'Then again the nerves and the heart are only the (resting) abode of the limiting adjuncts of the soul, for apart from its limiting adjuncts it

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<sup>1</sup> *satprājñayoś ca prasiddham eva brahmatvam. evam etāsu śrutiṣu trīṇy eva suṣuptisthānāni saṅkīrtitāni nāḍyaḥ purītad brahma ce 'ti. tatrā 'pi dvāramātraṁ nāḍyaḥ purītac ca, brahmai 'va tv ekam anapāyi suṣuptisthānam . . . . brahma tv anapāyi suptisthānam ity etat pratipādayāmaḥ tena tu vijñānena prayojanam asti jīvasya brahmātmatvāvadhāraṇaṁ svapna-jāgaritavyavahāravimuktatvāvadhāraṇaṁ ca. tasmād ātmai 'va suptisthānam.*

is impossible for the soul in itself to abide anywhere, because being non-different from Brahman, it rests in its own glory. And if we say that in deep sleep it abides in Brahman we do not mean thereby that there is a difference between the abode and that which abides, but there is absolute identity of the two, for the text says: "With that which is, he becomes united, he is gone to the Self" which means that the sleeping person has entered into his true nature.<sup>1</sup>

Another point to be noted is: it is not that the jīva ever attains to something which it had not before, namely brahmatva, because it never falls away from its own nature. It is as a contrast to the seeming loss of its nature in the waking and dream-states, on account of its connection with the limiting adjuncts of body &c. that it is said to attain to its own form in suṣupti when the adjuncts are merged in the Self. Therefore, it does not happen that sometimes it attains to the Absolute and sometimes does not.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *api ca nāḍyaḥ purītaḥ vā jīvasyo 'pādhyādhāra eva bhavati tatrā 'sya karaṇāni vartanta iti. na hy upādhisambandham antareṇa svata eva jīvasyā 'dhāraḥ kaścit sambhavati. brahmāvyatirekeṇa svamahimapraṭiṣṭhitatvāt; brahmādhāratvam apy asya suṣupte nai 'vā 'dhārādheyabhedābhiprāyeṇa ucyate, katham tarhi? tādātmyābhiprāyeṇa. yata āha — satā somya tadā sampanno bhavati svam apīto bhavati (Chānd. VI. viii. 1) iti. svasabdenā 'tmā 'bhilapyate, svarūpam āpannaḥ supto bhavati 'ty arthaḥ.*

<sup>2</sup> *api ca na kadācij jīvasya brahmaṇā sampattir nā 'sti svarūpasyā 'napāyitvāt. svapnajāgaritayos tu upādhisamparakavaśūt pararūpāpattim ivā 'pekṣya tadupaśamāt suṣupteḥ svarūpāpattir vivakṣyate. ataś ca suptāvasthāyām kadācit satā sampadyate kadācin na sampadyata ity ayuktam.*

Still another point which may be noted is the definition of *suṣupti* accomplished by Śāṅkara as that state in which there is no particularised form of experience. 'Moreover even if we admit that there are different places for the soul in deep sleep, still there does not result from that difference of place any difference in the quality of deep sleep which is in all cases characterised by the *cessation of special cognition*; it is therefore, more appropriate to say that the soul does (in deep sleep) not cognise on account of its oneness, having become united with Brahman; according to the śruti, "How should we know another?"' (*Br. U. IV.v.15*). If further the sleeping soul does rest in the *nāḍis* and the *purītat*, it would be impossible to assign any reason for its non-cognising, because, in that case, it would continue to have diversity for its object; according to the śruti, 'When there is, as it were, duality, then one sees the other' etc.<sup>1</sup>

We may also note here that on account of the absence of cognition or *viśeṣavijñāna* it is not possible to distinguish the content of *suṣupti* from that of *nirvikalpa-samādhi*, for the latter also is said to be free from cognition; for only the states with cognition can be distinguished from each other. The state in which there arrives the knowledge in the form of *vṛttis*, 'I am Brahman', 'All this is Brahman,' 'All this is Ātman' is *savikalpa-samādhi*. In the commentary to II.i.9, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, Śāṅkara

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<sup>1</sup> *api ca sthānavikalpābhyupagame 'pi viśeṣavijñānopasāmalakṣaṇam tāvat suṣuptam na kvacid viśiṣyate. tatra sati sampannas tāvat tadekatvān na vijānātī 'ti yuktam; tat kena kam vijānīyāt (Br. U. II. iv. 14) iti śruteḥ. nāḍīṣu purītati ca śayānasya na kiñcid avijñāne kāraṇam śakyam vijñātum. bhedaviśayatvāt, yatra vā anyad iva syāt tatrā 'nyo 'nyat paśyēt (Br. U. IV. iii. 31) iti śruteḥ.*

has bracketed *suṣupti* and *samādhi* together as states in which false knowledge is not necessarily removed, and hence on returning to the waking state, the consciousness of separation and duality comes into existence. 'Then with regard to the objection that if we assume all distinctions to pass (at the time of re-absorption of the universe) into the state of non-distinction, there would be no special reason for the origination of a new world affected with distinctions, we likewise refer to the existence of parallel instances. For the case is parallel to that of deep sleep and trance. In those states also, the soul enters into an essential condition of non-distinction; nevertheless, wrong knowledge being not yet finally overcome, the old state of distinction re-establishes itself as soon as the soul awakens from its sleep or trance.... For just as during the subsistence of the world, the phenomena of multifarious distinct existence, based on wrong knowledge, proceed unimpeded like the vision of a dream, although there is only one highest Self devoid of all distinction, so we infer there remains even after absorption the power of distinction (potential distinction) founded on wrong knowledge.'<sup>1</sup> The above passage also explains now, having attained to non-separation from Brahman in *suṣupti* and *samādhi*, we find ourselves separate from it on waking up again. There

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<sup>1</sup> *yat punar etad uktam samastasya vibhāgasyā 'vibhāga-prāpteh punar vibhāgeno 'tpattau niyamakāraṇam no 'papadyata-iti. ayam apy adosaḥ. dr̥ṣṭāntabhāvād eva. yathā hi suṣupti-samādhyādāv api satyām svābhāvikyām avibhāgaprāptau mithyājñānasya anapoditatvāt pūrvavat punaḥ prabodhe vibhāgo bhavaty, evam ihā 'pi bhaviṣyati.....yathā hi avibhāge 'pi paramātmani mithyājñānapratibaddho vibhāgavyavahārah svapnavad avyāhataḥ sthito dr̥ṣyate, evam apītav api mithyājñānapratibaddhai 'va vibhāgaśaktir anumāsyate.*

is no causality operating there where there is neither time nor space nor any phenomenon. Therefore, the only explanation offered by Vedānta is false knowledge—mithyājñāna, coming back again in the next waking state through the power of avidyā. But this very avidyā is not to be taken to have really existed in the suṣupti or samādhi state itself, because it is adventitious, āgantuka. It comes and goes. It comes in the waking and dream and disappears in sleep; if it has not been destroyed in the intellect or antaḥkaraṇa before suṣupti, the same comes back with the return of that antaḥkaraṇa in the next waking state. If the antaḥkaraṇa was conscious of its separation from Brahman in the previous waking state with the consciousness of being a lion or a snake or a bird or a mosquito, this consciousness returns in the next waking also; the consciousness of separation from Brahman in spite of the unity in suṣupti reappears. If, on the other hand, the antaḥkaraṇa which has given up its false idea of separation from Brahman goes to sleep, it comes back again with the consciousness of identity in the form, 'I am Brahman'. Thus in his case there is no rebirth or punar-utpatti; for being Brahman, he is as good as unborn. It is, therefore, quite clear that the destruction of false knowledge should take place not in suṣupti or samādhi, but only in the waking state, and there is no other way to it except through reason.

Though the above passage is quoted here only to show that samādhi is as much a state of unenlightenment as suṣupti according to Śaṅkara, an explanation for the statement that mithyājñāna continues to exist in suṣupti, whereas all along we have been refuting it from the Upaniṣads and Śaṅkara, seems to be necessary. The explanation is that Śaṅkara only says that it is inferred, there is only anumāna in the waking, not anubhava, in

those states, of such false knowledge, and when anubhava contradicts anumāna the latter must be rejected and anubhava must be accepted as pramāṇa.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, the statement of Śaṅkara that mithyājñāna in suṣupti and samādhi is inferred, does not contradict our contention that mithyājñāna does not exist in suṣupti and samādhi.

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<sup>1</sup> *na cā 'numānam pratyakṣavirodhe prāmāṇyam labhate*  
(*Br. bhāṣya, II. i. 20*).

## 6. MĀNDŪKYOPANIṢAD

This is the only Upaniṣad in which a distinction is made between the Ātman of deep sleep and the Ātman of the state of Truth-realization. The former is called *prājña* and the latter *turīya*. We have already shown in Part I that the concept of *turīya* as other than the Ātman of deep sleep is a philosophical superfluity. This will now be borne out by an examination of the definition of *turīya* as given in this Upaniṣad. The *turīya* is said to be: 'That which is not conscious of the internal world nor of the external world, nor that which is conscious of both, nor that which is a mass of sentiency, nor that which is simple consciousness, nor that which is insentient. It is unseen by any senseorgan, nor related to anything, incomprehensible by the mind, uninferable, unthinkable, indestructible, essential of the nature of consciousness, constituting the Self alone, the negation of all phenomena, the peaceful, all-blissful and the non-dual. This is known as the fourth, *turīya*. This is the Ātman and it has to be realized' (*Māṇḍūkya*, U. I. 7). Now, is there a single term in this definition of *turīya*, which is not applicable to the Self in deep sleep? We find there is not. Therefore, the so-called *turīya* is none other than *samprasāda*. We are confirmed in this view by a key-sentence of Śaṅkara in the commentary on the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, I.2, where the Self of deep sleep is sought to be identified with the *turīya* which is defined later. 'That, is designated as *prājña* (when it is viewed as the cause of the phenomenal world) will be described as *turīya* separately when it is not viewed as the cause and when it is free from all phenomenal relationship (such as that of the body etc. in its absolutely real aspect).'<sup>1</sup> The identity

<sup>1</sup> *tām abījāvasthām tasyai 'va prājñāśabdavācyaṣya turīya-  
tvena dehādīsambandharahitām pāramārthikīm pṛthag vakṣyati.*

of turīya with samprasāda is, therefore, quite clear. What remains for us is to explain the introduction of the additional concept, prājña. It is necessary to see if the terms applied to prājña are verified by experience. That it is desireless does tally with our experience; that it is free from dream is also according to experience. But that it is a mass of sentiency in the sense of the experience of the jāgrat and the svapna all dumped together is not borne out by experience. Therefore, Śaṅkara is very careful to say, *ata eva svapnajāgranmanaspandanāni prajñānāni ghanībhūtanī 'va*. The word 'iva' (as if) is very significant as showing that it is wrongly viewed as prajñānaghana. And the reason for calling it prajñānaghana is given as want of discrimination in that state, *se' yam avasthā avivekarūpatvāt prajñānaghanam ucyate*. The description of prājña as a mass of sentiency is not, therefore, a description of the experience of suṣupti as such, but our view of it before sufficient analysis. This is again supported by other terms applied to the experience of suṣupti such as sarveśvara, sarvajña, antaryāmin &c., for who has ever experienced in deep sleep that he is the ruler of the universe, or is the inner controller of the jīvas and the jagat, or is the all-knowing Being, knowing the past, present and future of all created entities in the universe or that he is the origin and dissolution of all beings? It is quite clear, therefore, these attributes are heaped on the innocent Ātman of deep sleep, rather than experienced. It is a theological attempt to find a place for a personal God of the faithful in a philosophical system, but wrongly placed in suṣupti state. The mystics of all religions have experienced the presence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, creating, destroying sentient Being in their heightened mystic states, in savikalpa-samādhi. Such a state would have been the appropriate place for assigning the experience of the personal God. The true

explanation, therefore, for thrusting the experience of Īśvara into the metaphysics of avasthātraya is that it is only a theological device to give a philosophical appearance to the concept of the personal God. But experience flatly refuses to certify the identification of the Self of deep sleep with personal God.

With regard to the concept of prājña as the state of bīja, or as the potential state of future creation, it is significant to remember that the concept of causality applied to it is only in the sense that there is no realization of Truth in that state. *prājñas tu bījabhāvenai 'va baddhaḥ tattvāprabodham eva hi bījaprājñatve nimittam.*

This we have explained as due to the absence of antaḥkaraṇa, the instrument with which the Truth has to be realized. There is not, therefore, a second positive entity other than the Ātman, which exists potentially as the cause of the bondage. The absence of tattvāgrahaṇa (realization of Truth) in suṣṭi, therefore, does not in any way justify our conception of turīya as different from the Self of the state of jñāna where tattvāgrahaṇa and anyathāgrahaṇa are equally absent. The Ātman of deep sleep is, therefore, not more or less related to the world of waking or dream than the turīya. That it is free from avidyā we have already seen. For these reasons, our view that the turīya as the Ātman of the state of Truth-realization can be put within the waking state is justified. It may, therefore, be rejected as an entity experienced in any state other than the avasthātrayas. All the other Upaniṣads through which we have gone do not at all make any reference to this turīya; and their concept of samprasāda is the same as the turīya of the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*.

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## REVIEWS

*Oriental Institute Magazine*, Baroda wrote:

‘The book under review is “an attempt to present the Brahmavidyā shorn of the mystical and theological accretions” as the author would have it and the author has ably performed the task he had in view. The book is divided into two parts: In the first part, the author explains the theory of Vedānta in a rational way, without reference to Vedānta texts and in the second part, he quotes Upaniṣadic texts with his elucidations on them, to show that what he has proved by reasoning is supported by the Śruti texts.

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‘The author has rightly understood the subtle theory of Vedānta and has put it in so simple a language as to be easily understood even by a layman. We congratulate the author on such a splendid production and strongly recommend it to every seeker of Truth.’

*The Hindu*, Madras wrote:

‘.....The book deserves to be carefully studied by the students of Advaita Vedānta in particular.’

*The Indian Review*, Madras wrote:

‘.....The book presents in a very simple language the difficult subject of Brahmavidyā.’

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